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“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life,1 Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”2
I. NARRATIVE
Moshe Schwab, an Orthodox Jew from Miami, and his family re-
turned from a trip to Disney World on August 23, 2007.3  After clean-
ing up from dinner, Moshe called his children to ask them to take their
showers and get ready for bed.4  His four-year-old daughter, Aliza, did
not come.5  Concerned, Moshe quickly went to look for her–starting
with the swimming pool.6  He found the life vest she wore the whole
afternoon sitting beside the pool and then immediately spotted her ly-
ing on the bottom of the pool.7  In a moment, “the laughing, running,
[and] playful” daughter the Schwabs had known became something
else; her heart stopped beating.8  Medical personnel arrived quickly
and successfully administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR),
but Aliza never regained consciousness and remains on a respirator as
she is no longer able to breathe independently.9
Eventually, Aliza’s hospital determined that further medical care
on her behalf was “unethical” and thereby decided to “pull the plug.”10
The Schwabs sought rabbinic authority to guide both their emotional
1. “Life,” in the context of our Declaration of Independence, is generally understood
to mean that the state may not impede upon the interest that each person has in
his own life.  That is, the state may not kill a person even if the benefits of doing
so outweigh the costs.  Capital punishment, an institution that predated the Dec-
laration by thousands of years, presents an interesting exception to the general
rule.  The scope of that exception and its theoretical justifications are beyond the
scope of this Article.  Rather, I am interested in another potential exception:
whether the important governmental interest of controlling health care costs pro-
vides a basis for the state to impede, under certain specified circumstances, upon
the interests of an individual in his life.
2. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
3. Toby B. Katz, Clinging to Life, MISHPACHA, Jan. 2, 2008, at 20.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 19, 20.
10. Id. at 21.
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response as well as to instruct them how to approach the hospital;
they were told to fight the hospital, which they did.11  Aliza’s doctors
objected, stating that they “saw no further value in continuing to keep
. . . Aliza alive, when her organs could benefit other children who were
also in desperate need.”12  Accordingly, in disregard to the preferences
and protests of the Schwab family, Aliza’s doctors instructed her fam-
ily to prepare themselves for the death of their daughter and to inform
whomever they desired.13  The Schwabs made many calls, not to make
“final arrangements” but to ask total strangers who previously knew
nothing of them, had never seen Aliza, and probably never would, to
pray on her behalf that she might see another day.14  Apparently,
thousands of these strangers responded as e-mail requests for prayers
on behalf of Aliza quickly circulated the globe.15
The hospital agreed not to unilaterally terminate Aliza’s treat-
ment, instead giving the Schawbs seven days to find a different care
provider.16  Eventually, the hospital agreed to abandon the seven-day
requirement as well because Aliza’s condition began to stabilize.17
Her parents decided to care for Aliza at home and transformed a room
in their house into a mini intensive care unit.18  The hospital granted
them some time to learn how to operate various pieces of complicated
medical equipment.19  Sadly, their opportunity to care for their daugh-
ter at home did not last long. Within days, Aliza had to return to the
hospital (wisely, her parents took her to a different area hospital) with
a “massive” infection.20  Aliza returned home weeks later but could no
longer move her hands and feet.21  Despite Aliza’s desperate and dete-
11. Id. at 20.
12. Id. The objections of the hospital are rather unusual.  I am personally not aware
of another futility case in which the hospital wanted to terminate treatment for
utilitarian reasons stated so explicitly.  While cost savings and similar utility in-
terests are always just under the surface in every futility case, hospitals usually
couch their objections in other language.  The reason they do so, I think, is obvi-
ous.  No mentally balanced person would advocate kidnapping and killing people
to harvest their organs.  While using available organs to help others is a noble
and valuable cause, any discussion regarding the availability and use of a given
patient’s organs cannot begin until it is resolved that the patient is dead or close
enough to being dead to satisfy legal and normative objections.  Organ harvesting
is not a legitimate basis to terminate treatment absent other considerations.
This Article addresses whether the “futility” of continued aggressive medical care
is a valid reason to force the termination of treatment for utilitarian or other
purposes.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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riorating state, her siblings continue to show her love and affection
with zeal.22  Her brothers and sisters run to her room upon returning
from school to read to her, kiss her, tell her stories, and simply be her
siblings.23  And her parent’s devotion to her care is heroic. For exam-
ple, Aliza’s parents significantly reduced their hours in their small
business as part of an effort to devote much of their time and energy to
Aliza’s care.24
Why does the Schwab family continue to care for their daughter
with such devotion?  One can understand that they love their daugh-
ter, even given that she exists as a mere shadow of her former self, but
it may be hard for some to understand how that love is capable of
driving Aliza’s parents and family to these dramatic (and expensive)
measures.  For the Schawbs, there was no question.  While Aliza is not
responsive and may not be physically aware of her surroundings, her
parents believe that her soul is fully aware, and that belief drives
them.  Her soul knows “how much her parents love her and how hard
they are trying to make her life as good as it can possibly be. . . . Al-
though she is not awake, her neshama25 knows everything.”26  For the
Schwabs, this is not science fiction, nor is it theoretical; it is a belief
that will govern their daily lives for the foreseeable future.  As the
reporter sent to observe the Schwabs prepared to take leave, Aliza’s
mother gave her the following revealing message:  “We’re happy that
. . . Aliza is here.  Every day that she’s here with us is a good day for
us.”27
II. INTRODUCTION
The year 1987 began a revolution in the medical community.  At
around that time, doctors and hospitals began working to establish a
policy through which physicians would be able to withhold or with-
draw medical treatment when a patient or surrogate requests specific
treatment over the objections of the patient’s physician.28  Under
these new policies, doctors would be able to override “patient auton-
omy”29 on the basis of their determination that further treatment is
22. Id. at 22
23. Id.
24. Id. at 21–22.
25. “Neshama” is Hebrew for “soul.” See Milon: English Hebrew Dictionary, http://
www.milon.co.il/ (enter “neshama” in search bar and press “translate”).
26. Katz, supra note 3, at 22 (footnote added).
27. Id. at 23.
28. Paul R. Helft et al., The Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 293, 293 (2000).
29. The right of a patient to decline unwanted medical treatment, and thus the au-
tonomy of the patient, was firmly established in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).  The autonomy of the patient is, of
course, not without limits. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
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“futile,” “inappropriate,” “nonbeneficial,” “ethically objectionable,” or
“not medically indicated.”30  These terms are all various ways of
describing “medical futility.”  While there does not seem to be a con-
sensus definition of futility, proponents of a robust “medical futility”
doctrine all agree that when it can be determined that further aggres-
sive medical care is of no benefit to the patient (perhaps because there
is no statistical chance of recovery, perhaps because any recovery seen
will be qualitatively negligible, perhaps because the harm likely to be
caused to the patient by continued treatment outweighs any benefit to
the patient) there is no obligation to provide that treatment.31
A study in the early 1990’s illustrated the pervasiveness of the fu-
tility movement despite it being just a few years old.  Dr. David A.
Asch, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, surveyed 879 doc-
tors in intensive care units around the country and found that over
80% of responding doctors admitted to unilaterally withdrawing care
that they considered futile without ever consulting family members
regarding their intentions or offering them the opportunity to transfer
the patient.32  These families never knew that their loved ones lost
their lives before modern medicine lost the capacity to sustain them.
Perhaps surprisingly, a team of physicians writing for the New En-
gland Journal of Medicine sensed in 2000 that the futility movement,
which took the medical community by storm in its early years, was
dying and decided to unilaterally issue a do not resuscitate (DNR) or-
der on the movement.  In their article, The Rise and Fall of the Futility
Movement, these authors claimed that the movement’s failure to reach
consensus on important foundational matters was its death knell.33
Despite this DNR order, the futility movement persists, and according
to many accounts remains alive and well.34  It persists “[l]ike some
24–30 (1905) (holding that an individual’s autonomy is not absolute and is some-
times subservient to legitimate public health concerns and upholding on constitu-
tional grounds a state statute requiring immunization).
30. Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Alexander Morgan Capron, How Can Hospital Fu-
tility Policies Contribute to Establishing Standards of Practice?, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 524, 526 (2000).
31. See Helft et al., supra note 28, at 293.  A further inquiry into definitions is beyond
the scope of this Article as my interest is more broadly conceptual and, I believe,
my objections are applicable to all the various definitions of futility.
32. Gina Kolata, Withholding Care from Patients: Boston Case Asks, Who Decides?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at A1 (as appended Apr. 15, 1995).
33. Helft et al., supra note 28; see also Patrick Moore, Note, An End-of-Life Quandary
in Need of Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment
that Physicians are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REV. 433, 454 (2007) (refer-
ring to the Helft article as the “de facto obituary” of the futility movement).
34. See In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar.
22, 2004) (discussing futility); Hudson v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 177 S.W.3d 232,
235 (Tex. App. 2005) (noting that the lower court had denied plaintiff’s injunction
to compel the hospital to continue life-preserving support pursuant to state stat-
ute); Preston v. Meriter Hosp., 700 N.W.2d 158 (Wis. 2005) (discussing futility);
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB103.txt unknown Seq: 6 12-AUG-11 13:41
6 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad” wandering the halls of our nation’s hospitals,
stalking health care jurisprudence, and frightening sick patients and
their loved ones.35
State public health agencies and hospitals around the country con-
tinue to adopt statutes and internal guidelines furthering the medical
futility movement.  For example, in 1999, the State of California
adopted a statute that, in its simplicity and brevity (just forty-six
words) captures the efforts of the futility movement.36  It reads:  “A
health care provider or health care institution may decline to comply
with an individual health care instruction or health care decision that
requires medically ineffective health care or health care contrary to
generally accepted health care standards applicable to the health care
provider or institution.”37  In its simplicity, the statute neglects to de-
fine what makes a procedure “medically ineffective” or “contrary to
generally accepted health care standards.”  If we read the statute to
simply apply the generally accepted standard of care, which the latter
phrase strongly implies, the statute grants the medical profession
great latitude to decide whom and when to treat.  Based on this stat-
ute, it appears that if the medical community were to reach consensus
that a given procedure, dialysis for example, is too expensive to ever
justify associated state expenditures, that community could lawfully
unilaterally cease to provide that procedure.38  Other states have
adopted statutes that accomplish the same goals utilizing different
language.39  Concurrently, health care organizations around the coun-
Katz, supra note 9 (offering a factual account involving medical futility that R
played out in 2007); Pam Belluck, Even as Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to
Prolong Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at A1 (discussing growing tensions be-
tween patients and medical providers in popular media in 2005).
35. This simile is borrowed from Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (West 2007).
37. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 4736 (describing the procedure that medical
providers must take to notify a patient of a possible transfer and ultimately to
transfer the patient to another medical provider).
38. See Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 30, at 528–29 (stating that California
residents were concerned that the preferences of healthcare professionals might
override the wishes of the general community).
39. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-807 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN.
§ 5-611 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 14–15 (West 2004); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984 (McKinney 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808
(West, Westlaw through 2010 First Ex. Sess. and 2010 Reg. Sess.); Texas Ad-
vance Directives Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.001–166.166
(West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.
2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.060 (West 2002); See also MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH–GEN. § 5-613 (West 2009) (pertaining to patient transfer).
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try have been developing futile care policies40 and informal surveys of
hospital ethics specialists in 2005 indicated a significant increase in
recent years of ethical clashes that pit families who are pushing for
aggressive life support against doctors and nurses who oppose such
measures.41  And new futility episodes arise on a nearly constant
basis.42
This Article will explore the notion of medical futility, arguing that
it cannot (or should not) exist as a matter of medical ethics and that
physicians cannot be permitted to serve as the final arbiters of life and
death.  Part III of this Article will examine the case law surrounding
medical futility, showing that the case law is complicated and an at-
tempt to formulate a concise statement of the law is elusive.  Addition-
ally, it will consider what is arguably the most rigorous state statute
on the subject, the Texas Advance Directives Act,43 as a possible
model for future statutory medical futility programs.  Part IV will dis-
cuss the bias inherent in words like “futile” and “inappropriate.”  Ad-
ditionally, it will consider the intuitional bias in the medical
profession which clouds discussion about the futility movement and
will attempt to show how some other modes of thought provide differ-
ent answers to the question of “futility.”  I will argue that because
medical futility rests on a presumption against religious and super-
natural theory, about which medical science has (or ought to have) no
opinion, it fails as a logical argument.  It is also distinctly inappropri-
ate for addressing futility cases because it imposes a physiological ob-
jective on the patient where the patient’s goals might be entirely a-
physiological.  Part V will address three of the most powerful argu-
ments in favor of the cessation of “futile” treatment: that aggressive
treatment for patients who have a tremendously small chance of re-
covery (1) is often physically and emotionally painful, amounting to
torture of the patient; (2) undermines physician autonomy, turning
40. Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Letter to the Editor: The Rise and Fall of the Futility
Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1575, 1575 (2000); Schneiderman & Capron,
supra note 30.
41. BELLUCK, supra note 34.  For example, Dr. Lachlan Forrow, the director of ethics
programs at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, stated that around
1990, eighty percent of the ethics cases that came before him were right-to-die
cases whereas in 2005, about eighty percent were right-to-life cases (including
futility cases). Id.
42. Eleanor Harding, Battersea Woman’s Life Support Cut ‘Without Family’s Permis-
sion’, YOUR LOCAL GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2010, 7:00 AM) http://www.yourlocal
guardian.co.uk/news/4881529.Wife_s_life_support_cut__without_family_s_perm
ission_/ (“Shun-Yuen Pang, a former British serviceman, asked for his wife Lai-
Mei to be kept alive for two more days at Kings College Hospital so that her three
sons could have a chance to say a last goodbye. . . . Mr Pang, 60, said: ‘The doctor
told me, “it’s not you who decides—it’s the hospital.  We are turning it off in 30
minutes.’”).
43. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.001–166.166 (West 2010).
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the physician from a moral agent into a complacent slave of his pa-
tient who acts regardless of his personal and moral objections; and (3)
exhausts scarce medical resources which could be better spent on
other patients.
III. A SAMPLE OF THE CASE AND STATUTORY LAW
REGARDING THE FUTILITY MOVEMENT
Mary Wohlford did not want her doctors to sustain her if she ever
suffered from severe medical complications.44  To that end, she chose
to memorialize her intentions to ensure that there would be no confu-
sion in the future.45  She had her instructions tattooed across her
chest: “DO NOT RESUSCITATE.”46  Few patients express their
desires so conspicuously and many may not even be consciously aware
of their desires.  The decision to undergo aggressive medical treat-
ment or to welcome death over suffering is a complicated one, about
which many patients may be conflicted.47  But even where a patient
knows exactly what she wants, as did Ms. Wohlford, the extent to
which a physician must comply with his patient’s wishes is unclear.  A
patient’s autonomy is not absolute.  In some circumstances, certain
state interests will override a patient’s clearly expressed interests.48
Knowing what those limitations are, as a matter of law, is rather diffi-
cult because the body of law which has developed in the field of medi-
cal futility over the past two decades is fraught with inconsistency.
Much of the case law indicates that courts are generally friendly to
patients seeking an injunction that will compel treatment while they
are still alive, but are less receptive to families seeking damages after
“futile” care is withdrawn, as long as the withdrawal was consistent
with prevailing standards of care.49  This is unfortunate because
“[n]owhere is clear enunciation of a physician’s role more important
than in the medical futility arena, where clinical scenarios place pa-
tient and physician values in (often) irreconcilable conflict.”50  This
44. Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Who Decides Whether a Patient Lives or
Dies?, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, at 30.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See John Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die?, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34,  at 34,
42(1997). .
48. See In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“Clearly, however, the
right to self-determination as to one’s own medical treatment is not absolute.
The state has interests that are implicated in cases involving the termination of
life[-]sustaining treatment.”).
49. Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 30, at 530; Moore, supra note 33, at 436–37;
Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 44, at 37.
50. Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21
AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 223 (1995).
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Part will attempt to outline existing law, recognizing that it may be
difficult to offer a concise statement of the law.
A. Early Pivotal Cases
By most accounts,51 the first judicial opinion issued in the context
of medical futility came in 1991 with In re Wanglie.52  In Wanglie, the
hospital petitioned a court to enable it to withdraw life-sustaining
care from a patient who was permanently unconscious, but did not ask
the court for declaratory judgment on those grounds.53  Instead, it
asked the court to replace Mrs. Wanglie’s guardian, her husband of
fifty-three years.54  Mr. Wanglie strongly opposed the wishes of his
wife’s attending physicians; rather than fighting him on the merits,
they simply challenged his authority to speak on behalf of his wife.55
The physicians made no attempt to show that (1) Mr. Wanglie was
incompetent, (2) they shared Mrs. Wanglie’s religious and moral be-
liefs, (3) they were dedicated to promoting her welfare, or (4) any fam-
ily members contested Mr. Wanglie’s ability to speak on his wife’s
behalf.56  The court characterized the question before it as follows:
“[W]hether it is in the best interest of an elderly woman who is coma-
tose, gravely ill, and ventilator-dependent to have decisions about her
medical care made by her husband of fifty-three years or by a [court-
appointed] stranger.”57  Not surprisingly, the court chose to retain Mr.
Wanglie as guardian.58
51. See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician’s
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1259 (1993); Moore, supra note
30, at 441–43;.
52. PX-91-283, (Prob. Ct. Minn. Dist. Ct. July 1, 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. &
MED. 369 (1991) [hereinafter Wanglie].
53. See id.
54. Id.; see Moore, supra note 30, at 441.
55. Cf. Wanglie, supra note 52.
56. Id. at 371–72.
57. Id. at 376.
58. Id. at 372.  Other medical providers have been successful in their efforts to re-
place a guardian.  This occurrence is rare and doing so seems to require a show-
ing that the guardian chosen by the patient displays little interest in acting for
the benefit of the patient, a very significant burden. See In re Guardianship of
Mason, 669 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).  I am aware of but one case
in which a court replaced a guardian simply because the guardian, opting for life
instead of death, made the “wrong” decision for the patient.  That case was de-
cided by a Michigan probate court in 1993 and seems to be nothing more than a
tragic anomaly. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by
Whom?—Parental Rights and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K
and Baby Terry Cases, 20 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 821, 822, 825–26 (1994) (citing In re
Achtabowski, No. G93-142173-GD (Mich. Prob. Ct. July 30, 1993)).  The probate
court’s decision was affirmed by the Michigan circuit court, which refused to
grant a stay pending further appeal, apparently in violation of Michigan state
law. Id. at 827 n.49.  This unusual decision violated state law, arguably federal
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In 1995, the jury in Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General Hospital59
was the first to explicitly assess monetary liability for failure to pro-
vide “futile” treatment.60 Gilgunn involved:
A [seventy-two-year-old] alert white female with multiple medical problems
including diabetes millitus for [thirty] years, megaloblastic anemia, chronic
renal insufficiency, cerebrovascular accident, coronary artery disease, periph-
eral vascular disease, breast cancer and mastectomy, Parkinson’s disease, bi-
lateral heel ulcers, and three previous hip replacements, [who] fell and broke
her hip in May 1989.61
Because of the fall, Catherine Gilgunn needed hip surgery but her ex-
tensive illnesses made any operation life threatening.62  Eventually,
her physicians were able to stabilize her other conditions so that they
could operate on her hip, but that stabilization was short lived.63  The
day after they scheduled her operation, Ms. Gilgunn suffered a grand
mal seizure, which was followed by a series of seizures over the suc-
ceeding five days.64  By the time her seizures subsided, Ms. Gilgunn
was no longer responsive to noise or pain.65  A short time later, she
had limited cognitive ability and her attending physicians recom-
mended placing a DNR order on Ms. Gilgunn.66  Her family objected,
requesting “everything possible to save [Ms. Gilgunn’s] life regardless
of cost.”67  Dr. Edwin Cassem, chair of the hospital’s Optimal Care
Committee, responded by writing a note that concluded:  “[The fam-
ily’s] confusion, anguish, misinformation, denial, and distress . . . do
not justify mistreating the patient.”68  Nevertheless, Ms. Gilgunn’s at-
tending physician agreed to rescind the DNR order in response to her
family’s objections.  A while later, Ms. Gilgunn’s eyes opened, she was
alert, and had some ability to communicate.69  The objections of her
family were vindicated.70  Sadly, their vindication was also short
lived. Ms. Gilgunn suffered more seizures, became unresponsive once
constitutional law, see id. at 826 n.46, normal standards of decency, and sensitiv-
ity, and is deserving of no further attention in this Article.
59. John J. Paris et al., Use of a DNR Order Over Family Objections: The Case of
Gilgunn v. MGH, 14 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 41 (1999) (discussing the facts and
holding in Gilgunn v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., No. 92-4820 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 21,
1995)).
60. Id.
61. Paris et al., supra note 59, at 41.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 42.  Presumably, they were referring to costs incurred by the hospital and
asked the hospital to do everything within its physical ability, even if that meant
incurring untold financial liability.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. See id.
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again, and suffered vomiting and gastroenterological bleeding.71  The
hospital attempted a second time to issue a DNR order and was less
responsive to the objections (sometimes including violent threats and
verbal obscenities)72 of Ms. Gilgunn’s family.73  Dr. Cassem wrote:
“[T]he family protests the exclusion of CPR, a procedure which is med-
ically contraindicated, inhumane, and unethical [under the circum-
stances].”74  Her neurologist described her prognosis for functional
recovery as “nil” and the director of the hospital’s intensive care unit
declared that further medical interventions were “futile.”75  On Au-
gust 7, 1989, the family was informed that the hospital’s decision to
remove ventilation was final and would take place over the next sev-
eral days.76  Ms. Gilgunn was pronounced dead the morning of August
10.77
Ms. Gilgunn’s family sued for damages on a theory of negligence.78
After just two hours of deliberation, the jury agreed that Ms. Gilgunn
would have requested CPR and other aggressive medical procedures if
she were sufficiently competent to do so, but that such treatment
would be “futile.”79  The jury found further that the actions of the hos-
pital and the physicians were in accord with the standard of care and
were thus not negligent.80  The plaintiffs filed an appeal but later
withdrew it for reasons unknown.81
B. Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center82 and Claims for
Emotional Distress
Claims against hospitals and physicians for emotional distress (ei-
ther negligent or intentional) have been rare. The case of Brianne
Rideout is an exception.83  At the age of two, Brianne was diagnosed
with a malignant brain tumor.84  She had surgery in February of 1992
to remove the tumor but, shortly thereafter, began to suffer from a
stupor and respiratory difficulty.85  Brianne’s parents were informed
that her condition was not curable but decided to pursue aggressive
71. Id.
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id. at 42
74. Id. at 42.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 45.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id.
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medical treatment nonetheless.86  On April 13, 1992, Brianne was
placed on a mechanical ventilator, which, from the prospective of her
doctors, did nothing but “prolong” her death (that is, the process of
dying).87  On May 20, 1992, the Rideouts learned that their health
insurance was about to be exhausted and, if Brianne’s aggressive med-
ical treatment was to continue, it would have to be with financial as-
sistance.88  The next day, Brianne’s attending physician, apparently
aware of Brianne’s disappearing medical insurance coverage,89 de-
cided to issue a DNR order on Brianne.90  The Rideouts objected, de-
manded continuing aggressive medical treatment, and responded:
“It’s okay for some people who don’t regard life and may want their
child dead for insurance, [sic] but we value Brianne and her life.”91  By
July 13, 1992, Brianne’s condition worsened and her attending physi-
cian, Dr. Lucking, decided that “the most prudent course of action
would be to remove Brianne’s ventilator” because continued venti-
latory support was, in his mind, “futile and inappropriate.”92  He
called the Rideouts at around 8:30 a.m. on July 14 to inform them that
he intended to remove Brianne’s ventilator later that day.93  The
Rideouts objected, in part because they felt Dr. Lucking was acting in
violation of their religious beliefs.94  Given their objections, he agreed
to delay one day.95
The morning of July 15, the Rideouts arrived at the hospital to try
to stop Dr. Lucking from removing Brianne’s ventilatory support.96
When Dr. Lucking learned that they were present he was poised to
disengage the ventilator; he asked his staff to order them to come to
Brianne’s room so they could attend their daughter’s death.97  Her
parents, still attempting to force Dr. Lucking to desist, did not come to
Brianne’s room.98  At 1:45 p.m., without her parents present, in clear
violation of her parent’s wishes, and without court order, Dr. Lucking
unilaterally removed Brianne’s ventilatory support.99  The hospital’s
chaplain, who was with Brianne at the time, announced over the hos-
pital’s intercom: “they turned her off, they turned her off!”100  The
86. Id.
87. Id. at 59–60.
88. Id. at 60.
89. See id. at 60–61.
90. Id. at 60.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 61–62.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 62.
97. Id. at 63.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Rideouts heard the announcement and ran to Brianne’s room crying
hysterically and screaming that their child had been murdered by her
doctor.101  Mr. Rideout was so upset that he suffered an acute asthma
attack.102  But Brianne was not dead.103  She was able to breathe in-
dependently after the ventilator was removed.104  Another doctor pre-
sent opined that because Brianne was breathing, it would not be
necessary to place her back on the ventilator.105  Tragically, that doc-
tor was wrong. Brianne died two days later in the presence of her
parents.106
In their complaint, the Rideouts stated that as a result of the inci-
dent, in addition to the asthma attack suffered by Mr. Rideout, the
Rideouts suffered from “intense headaches, nausea, depression, night-
mares, nervousness, insomnia, stress, anxiety, upset stomach, [and]
hysteria.”107  The defendants demurred to the Rideout’s complaint,
and in so doing defeated some of the Rideout’s causes of action.108  The
causes of action that survived demurrer were negligent infliction of
emotional distress,109 intentional infliction of emotional distress,110
lack of informed consent,111 violation of privacy-based parental
rights,112 free exercise of religion,113 and a claim for punitive dam-
ages.114  Apparently, this case never went to trial. My efforts to obtain
information about a possible settlement or further judicial pronounce-
ment on the merits of the case have been fruitless.
C. Claims Under the Emergency Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA)115
EMTALA has proven to be a great friend to plaintiffs in medical
futility cases.  This friendship, however, is accompanied with great
controversy.  EMTALA was designed as a mechanism to prevent hos-
pitals from “dumping” patients whom they did not wish to treat, usu-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id. at 64.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 68.
110. Id. at 70.
111. Id. at 73.
112. Id. at 84.
113. Id. at 87. I am not aware of another case which relied on the Free Exercise clause
to overturn a medical provider’s decision to withdraw care on the basis of its “fu-
tility.” The Free Exercise clause requires that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114. Rideout, 30 Pa. D. & C.4th at 96.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB103.txt unknown Seq: 14 12-AUG-11 13:41
14 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1
ally because those patients were not able to finance their medical
care.116  The purpose of EMTALA is “to get patients into the system
who might otherwise go untreated and be left without a remedy be-
cause traditional medical malpractice law affords no claim for failure
to treat.”117  Accordingly, EMTALA should not be misconstrued as a
federal malpractice statute.118  Nonetheless, several courts have
found in EMTALA a cause of action for futility plaintiffs.119  EMTALA
is a fairly large statute that has generated a great body of case law; a
thorough review of its provisions is beyond the scope of this Article.120
In 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressly held
that EMTALA required physicians to provide aggressive medical care
to a baby girl, Baby K, born with severe malformation and cognitive
deficiency, which was certain to claim her life.121  Baby K was af-
flicted with anencephaly, a prenatal condition that rendered her per-
manently unconscious and without the ability to “see, hear, or . . .
interact with her environment.”122  Typically, anencephaly causes in-
fant death within a matter of days.123  Baby K’s mother insisted that
her daughter receive mechanical respiration despite protests by her
medical providers that doing so was “inappropriate.”124  The hospital
tried, unsuccessfully, to transfer Baby K to another hospital.125  Even-
tually, the hospital was able to stabilize Baby K and sent her to a
nursing home.126  Following her transfer to the nursing home, Baby K
required periodic readmission to the hospital due to breathing abnor-
malities that were caused by her anencephaly.127  Following the sec-
ond readmission, the hospital sought declaratory relief stating that it
would not be obligated to treat Baby K in the future.128
116. See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir.
1996).
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
purpose of the statute was to prevent hospitals from “dumping” patients); Pres-
ton v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 700 N.W.2d 158, 176 (Wis. 2005) (stating that the fed-
eral statute was not meant to create federal medical malpractice liability).
119. See, e.g., Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592.
120. For a good analysis of the provisions of EMTALA, see generally Tiana Mayere
Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine
Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 145
(2004); Alicia K. Dowdy et al., The Anatomy of EMTALA: A Litigator’s Guide, 27
ST. MARY’S L.J. 463 (1996).
121. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592, 598.
122. Id. at 592.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 593.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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The court found that the “plain language” of EMTALA required the
hospital to treat, at its expense, anencephalic patients like Baby K
whenever presented to the hospital in distress, stating that Congress
rejected a case-by-case approach to determining when emergency
treatment would be required.129  In the court’s words: “EMTALA does
not carve out an exception for anencephalic infants in respiratory dis-
tress any more than it carves out an exception for comatose
patients.”130
Baby K has been excessively criticized.131  The specific critiques
are beyond the scope of this Article, but I will discuss one of them here
because it is particularly instructive.  Professor George Annas criti-
qued the trial court for drawing comparisons between the baby girl
suffering from anencephaly and other terminal patients who were in
need of emergency care for unrelated injuries (such as an AIDS pa-
tient in a car accident), stating that the comparison “was chillingly
wrong.”132  He argued, as did the dissent in Baby K,133 that Baby K’s
illness for which her family wanted attention was not respiratory fail-
ure but anencephaly, a condition for which there is no cure or medi-
cally cognizable treatment.134  He wrote:  “It is because of her
anencephaly itself that Baby K cannot benefit from any medical inter-
vention.”135  While Annas is certainly correct that the comparison be-
tween Baby K and any comatose patient is overly simplistic, he made
a logical error that plagues discourse in medical futility.  There is a
very big difference between stating that medical intervention cannot
cure a child with anencephaly and stating that such a child can expe-
rience no benefit as a result of that treatment.  The nature of that dis-
tinction will be a topic of discussion in Part IV of this Article.
The Fourth Circuit returned to EMTALA in 1996 with Bryan v.
Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia.136  However, Bryan
was different from Baby K as it involved a suit for damages in which
129. Id. at 598–99.  I am unaware whether the hospital objected to treating Baby K
generally (regardless of who was paying) or merely to treating Baby K at the
hospital’s expense (as charity care).  In this case, the question was merely aca-
demic because EMTALA, if applicable, would have required the hospital to ini-
tially bear the expenses. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2006) (setting forth the hospital’s
obligation to stabilize the patient with its staff and equipment).
130. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598. The court quoted the relevant portion of EMTALA, which
states that when a patient presents an emergency medical condition, the hospital
staff must either stabilize that patient or transfer her to another hospital, pro-
vided that certain criteria are met. Id. at 594 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)).
131. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 30, at 446.
132. George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to set the Standard of Emergency Care—The
Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1543 (1994).
133. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592, 598–99 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
134. Annas, supra note 132, at 1543. R
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
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the patient had already died.137  The court in Bryan found for the de-
fendants, dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.138  In Bryan, the patient, Mrs.
Robertson, was transferred to defendant hospital in respiratory dis-
tress.139  Her husband asked the hospital to “take all necessary mea-
sures to keep [his wife] alive and trust in G[-]d’s140 wisdom.”141  The
hospital attempted to stabilize Mrs. Robertson for twelve days, was
unsuccessful, and, on February 17, 1993, issued a DNR order over the
objections of Mr. Robertson.142  Mrs. Robertson died on February 25
from complications that were not treated pursuant to the DNR or-
der.143  The court held that EMTALA is not intended to preempt state
malpractice laws and that EMTALA does not require a hospital to at-
tempt to stabilize a patient indefinitely.144  The hospital’s efforts to
stabilize Mrs. Robertson for twelve days were sufficient under EM-
TALA, and accordingly, there could be no recovery for failure to pro-
vide indefinite treatment.145
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit adopted Bryan and then held that once
a patient is admitted to the hospital he is deemed “stable” for the pur-
poses of EMTALA:  “We hold that EMTALA’s stabilization require-
ment ends when an individual is admitted for inpatient care.”146  The
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is troubling.  It implies that a hospital can
discharge its obligations under EMTALA simply by admitting its
emergency patients into its general facility.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
seems to over-read Bryan, which is a highly fact-bound decision.
Bryan relies extensively upon the length of time that Mrs. Robertson
was in the E.R. and the time and energy that her hospital expended
attempting to stabilize her.147
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity to offer its opinion
on EMTALA in Moses v. Providence Hospital.148  In a well-reasoned
decision, the Sixth Circuit expressly held that a hospital does not sat-
isfy its obligations simply by admitting a patient and treating him for
six days.149 In the court’s words:
137. Id. at 350.
138. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
139. Id.
140. The name of G-d is hyphenated throughout this Article.  I have done this to com-
ply with provisions of Jewish law.
141. Bryan, 95 F.3d at 350 (footnote added).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 351.
145. Id. at 351, 53; see also Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So.2d 1072, 1075 n.2
(La. Ct. App. 1998) (approving of the decision in Bryan).
146. Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002).
147. Bryan, 95 F.3d at 350–52.
148. 561 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3499 (2010).
149. Id. at 582.
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The statute requires “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medi-
cal condition,” and forbids the patient’s release unless his condition has “been
stabilized.” A patient with an emergency medical condition is “stabilized”
when “no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during” the patient’s release from
the hospital.  Thus, EMTALA requires a hospital to treat a patient with an
emergency condition in such a way that, upon the patient’s release, no further
deterioration of the condition is likely.150
Moses is not a futility case as the patient was a psychiatric patient
who ultimately committed murder after being released prior to stabili-
zation.151  However, its holding may finally open the door for consis-
tency in the law by providing a basis for a damages award in future
futility cases.152
D. Futile Care for Infant Patients
Shemika A. Burks arrived at a Wisconsin hospital in 1999 preg-
nant just twenty-two weeks and complaining of cramps and contrac-
tions.153  One hour after arrival, she gave birth to a baby girl who
weighed seven ounces.154  Less than three hours after delivery, her
young helpless daughter died in her arms.155  The girl was born with a
heartbeat and had the ability to breathe but, being extremely prema-
ture, needed aggressive medical assistance to survive.156  The hospital
staff refused to treat the baby, despite Ms. Burks’ requests, stating
that doing so would not be “appropriate.”157  A neonatologist at the
hospital, Dr. Karlo Raab, wrote in an affidavit filed in conjunction
with the trial that “no attempt was made to resuscitate Shemika
Burks’ fetus” and that “resuscitation was not medically indicated for
[the] fetus and in fact is medically inappropriate” for a child the size of
Ms. Burks’ daughter,158 who was apparently also known as a
“fetus.”159
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 575–76.
152. For further analysis on EMTALA and the Sixth Circuit’s holding, see infra notes
413–15 and accompanying text.  At the time of this writing, the Centers for Medi-
care & Medicaid Services (CMS) is deliberating whether to issue new regulations
that would clarify whether, and under what circumstances, EMTALA applies to
inpatients. 75 Fed. Reg. 80762, 80765 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 489).
153. Burks v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 596 N.W.2d 391, 392 (Wis. 1999).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. I cannot help but comment on the insensitivity exhibited by Dr. Raab.  Even if we
accept as a given that Dr. Raab was under no legal or moral obligation to treat a
non-viable child, and we accept his conclusion that there was absolutely no way
that he could have helped Ms. Burks’ child, that does not give medical profession-
als a license to write in a manner likely to aggravate the grief of family members
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Ms. Burks filed a complaint, alleging negligent medical practice,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of EM-
TALA.160  The parties agreed to a partial settlement and a dismissal
of the first two causes of action.161  Litigation proceeded on the ques-
tion of whether a state fund was obligated to pay part of the dam-
ages,162 apparently presuming the applicability and possible violation
of EMTALA.  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that its state
fund163 is obligated to pay damages for an EMTALA violation when
the underlying harm was based on a “medical decision” not to provide
treatment.164  It held that failure to treat in this case was a “medical
decision” and subject to disbursement out of the state fund.165
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin had the opportunity to revisit the
applicability of EMTALA to premature infants in Preston v. Meriter
Hospital.166  Shannon Preston arrived at the hospital in her twenty-
fourth week of pregnancy.167  The following morning she gave birth to
a boy who weighed just 700 grams.168  According to Preston’s com-
in a document that they are likely to see.  Perhaps “fetus” is the technically cor-
rect word under prevailing convention within the medical community.  But I am
not sure why that should matter.  Referring to a live child as a “fetus” is a rhetori-
cal maneuver that presupposes the answers to important questions about life and
its function.  As I argue later in Part IV, the medical community has no institu-
tional competence with which to answer these important questions and ought to
adopt a rhetoric that reflects its intellectual limits.  And Dr. Raab personally
should be held responsible for not refraining from the use of convention (assum-
ing that, in fact, “fetus” is the appropriate term under prevailing convention)
knowing that his language would be likely to exacerbate the grief of a mourning
parent.
160. Burks, 596 NW.2d at 392–93.
161. Id. at 393.
162. Id.
163. Wisconsin’s “Patient Compensation Fund” (the name of the fund at the time of
the Burks litigation) is now the “Injured Patients and Families Compensation
Fund.” See Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, Injured Patients and Fami-
lies Compensation Fund, http://oci.wi.gov/pcf.htm (Mar. 15, 2011).  It was created
by statute in 1975 “to provide excess medical malpractice coverage for Wisconsin
health care providers.” Id.; see WIS. STAT. § 655.001–655.019 (2009–10).  Most
health care providers are obligated by statute to obtain primary medical malprac-
tice insurance from private insurance companies. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL
BUREAU, INJURED PATIENTS AND FAMILIES COMPENSATION FUND 1 (2011), availa-
ble at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/Informationalpapers/86_Injured%20Patients
%20and%20Families%20Compensation%20Fund.pdf.  The Fund covers malprac-
tice liability in excess of that amount. Id. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BU-
REAU, INJURED PATIENTS AND FAMILIES COMPENSATION FUND 1 (2011), available at
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/Informationalpapers/86_Injured%20Patients%20
and%20Families%20Compensation%20Fund.pdf.
164. Burks, 596 N.W.2d at 402.
165. Id. at 401–02.
166. Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 122, 284 Wis.2d 264, 700 N.W.2d 158.
167. Id. at ¶ 6.
168. Id. at ¶ 7.
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plaint, the hospital was aware of the birth of the child and that he
urgently needed medical care but “failed, refused, and neglected to
provide any care whatsoever to the newborn infant.”169  The com-
plaint alleged further that the hospital knew that without aggressive
medical intervention, “the infant child had virtually no medical
chance to survive, but nevertheless intentionally withheld all treat-
ment for the infant child who therefore died after two and one half
hours of life.”170  Preston sued for medical negligence, failure to obtain
informed consent, a state law claim for neglect of a patient, and viola-
tion of EMTALA.171  The trial court dismissed all four claims on sum-
mary judgment for procedural reasons.172  However, the EMTALA
claim went through a series of appeals, the most recent, and appar-
ently the final, installation of which was decided in January 2008,173
over eight years after the child’s death in November 1999.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that EMTALA, which per-
tains to emergency patients, was applicable despite that the baby was
never taken to the emergency room.174  The court noted that EM-
TALA refers to a patient coming to an “emergency department”175 and
“a hospital’s emergency department encompasses its birthing center”
as is compelled by both the legislative history of EMTALA and the
statute’s implementing regulations.176
On remand, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin (an intermediate
appellate court) examined the legislative history of EMTALA and the
statute’s implementing regulations further and ruled that EMTALA
applies only to new patients presented to the hospital in distress, not
to inpatients.177  The court found that Mrs. Preston’s newborn baby
169. Id. at ¶ 8.
170. Id.
171. Id. at ¶ 9.
172. Id.
173. Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 2008 WI App 25, 307 Wis.2d 704, 747 N.W.2d 173,
cert. denied, 2008 WI 40, 308 Wis.2d 611, 749 N.W.2d 662.
174. Preston, 284 Wis.2d 264, ¶ 38, 700 N.W.2d 158, 170.
175. EMTALA reads:  “[I]f any individual . . . comes to the emergency department and
a request is made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a
medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screen-
ing examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department.” 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
176. Preston, 284 Wis.2d 264, ¶ 25, 700 N.W.2d 158, 167 (“Indeed, it is a ridiculous
distinction, one which places form over substance, to state that the care a patient
receives depends on the door through which the patient walks.” (citing McIntyre
v. Schick, 795 F. Supp. 777, 781 (E.D. Va. 1992))).
177. Preston, 307 Wis.2d 704, ¶ 54, 747 N.W.2d 173, 187.  In truth, the question of
whether EMTALA covers inpatients is not as simple as Wisconsin’s courts im-
plied.  Prior to a 2003 regulation, a split between the federal circuits arose re-
garding this question. See, e.g., Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d
1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (EMTALA does not apply to inpatients); Thornton v.
Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990) (EMTALA does, in some circum-
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was an inpatient and thus excluded him from protection under EM-
TALA.178  “[T]o conclude that [the child] was not an inpatient at the
hospital under EMTALA even though his laboring mother was, would
defy common sense.”179  Moreover, the court ruled that the question of
whether a mother and her newborn child are inpatients is a question
of law, not fact.180  Stated succinctly, “when a hospital provides inpa-
tient care to a woman that involves treating her fetus simultaneously,
the unborn child is a second inpatient, admitted at the same time as
the mother.”181  As a result, the Court of Appeals rejected Shannon
Preston’s claim for damages under EMTALA.182  The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin declined to review this important decision.183
The persuasive authority of Preston remains unclear following a
2002 amendment to EMTALA known as the Born Alive Infant Protec-
tion Act (BAIPA)184 and regulations issued in 2003.185  The principle
facts of Preston occurred in 1999 and so the Wisconsin courts did not
consider the 2002 and 2003 legal changes.186  Under the new rules, a
“born alive” infant is deemed an “individual” and, presumably, must
be assessed separately from the infant’s mother.187  If so, it should
follow that an unborn fetus cannot be an inpatient but rather must be
admitted to the hospital at birth.188  Indeed, CMS concluded in a gui-
dance statement issued on the interaction between EMTALA and
BAIPA that where a labor and delivery ward qualifies as a “dedicated
emergency department” (defined by the 2003 regulations), a child born
alive in that ward may be covered by EMTALA.189  Assuming that to
stances, apply to inpatients).  The 2003 regulations and the Supreme Court’s de-
nial of certiorari in a 2008 case seem to have resolved that split consistent with
Wisconsin’s ruling.  Thaddeus M. Pope, EMTALA: Its Application to Newborn In-
fants, 4 ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, Mar. 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1121373 (last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2); Morgan v. N.
Miss. Med. Ctr., 552 U.S. 1098 (2008) (denying certiorari)).  For more on these
developments, see id.
178. Preston, 307 Wis.2d 704, ¶ 57, 747 N.W.2d 173.
179. Id. at ¶ 55.
180. Id. at ¶ 56–57.
181. Id. at ¶ 57.
182. Id. at ¶ 1.
183. Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 2008 WI 40, 308 Wis.2d 611, 749 N.W.2d 662.
184. Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (2002) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2006)).
185. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i) (2010) (stating that EMTALA does not apply to pa-
tients admitted in good faith as inpatients).
186. See Preston, 307 Wis.2d 704, 747 N.W.2d 173.
187. See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2006); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i) (2010) (stating that the
exemption applicable to inpatients applies to those “individual[s]” who had been
previously screened).
188. Pope, supra note 177.
189. Memorandum from Director, Survey and Certification Grp., Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., to State Survey Agency Directors 5 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SurveyCertificationGenInfo/downloads/SCLetter05-26.p
df.
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be true, EMTALA appears to categorically require covered medical
providers to treat newborn infants that present an emergent condi-
tion, regardless of where the infant is born or the legal status of the
mother.  To my knowledge, the courts have yet to address this
question.190
Another case originating in the late 1990s yielded very different
results from those in Preston.  Ryan Nguyen was born in a Washing-
ton State hospital with kidney, lung, and intestinal problems and pos-
sible brain damage.191  His doctors decided that aggressive treatment
was futile and opted to discontinue vital kidney dialysis.192  They re-
moved Ryan from the dialysis machine; he remained in that state for
eleven long days until Ryan’s parents were able to compel dialysis
with a court order.193  Eventually, the Nguyens located a doctor in
Portland who would accept care of Ryan, perform the necessary sur-
gery, and slowly wean Ryan off dialysis.194  Ryan went home to his
family just four months after his transfer to Portland.195  Although he
had to return to the hospital with high fevers and infections on several
occasions thereafter, he was apparently able to lead a relatively nor-
mal life for the next four years.196  In 1999, after four and one half
years of life, Ryan finally succumbed to his condition.197  The decision
by Ryan’s parents to continue care and eventually bring Ryan home
was arguably a tremendous success.198  Ryan had the opportunity to
learn from his parents and develop over the next four years while his
parents got the pleasure of teaching their son and building a relation-
ship with him.  After Ryan’s death, his father remained “baffled” that
he had to work so hard to keep his son alive and be his father for those
four years.199  Further, he continues to blame Ryan’s first doctors for
hastening Ryan’s death by neglecting him those eleven days very
early in his life.200
190. As indicated, infra note 152, CMS may issue additional regulations on this topic,
which would likely provide helpful clarification on the applicability of EMTALA
to newborn infants.
191. Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 987 P.2d 634, 635 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Carol M. Ostrom, Baby Ryan’s Legacy–A Debate over Life, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
27, 1999, at A1.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See infra note 426 and accompanying text. Contra Ostrom, supra note 194.
199. Ostrom, supra note 194.
200. Id.
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E. The Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA),201 a Robust
Statutory Solution?
In September 1999, Texas became the first202 state to adopt a stat-
utory framework for a formalized and well-defined review process per-
taining to medical futility.203  Texas’s success in transforming the
legal landscape is questionable.204  A survey conducted in 2004 of the
409 hospital members of the Texas Hospital Association revealed that
just 30% of responding hospitals (approximately 48% of the hospitals
surveyed returned responses)205 utilized the statute in an actual case
and that 19% of respondents were unaware that the statute even
existed.206
Under TADA, when a physician refuses to honor an advance direc-
tive or other request for medical treatment from a patient desiring
aggressive medical care, the physician must inform the patient (or the
patient’s surrogate) of his desire not to provide said aggressive
care.207  After the patient or surrogate receives at least forty-eight
hours notice, an ethics committee holds a hearing to review the physi-
cian’s decision and, following the hearing, provides the patient or sur-
rogate with a written explanation of the committee’s findings.208  If
the committee agrees with the physician, aggressive care will continue
for another ten days (courts also have the authority to grant an exten-
sion under certain circumstances) during which time the patient or
surrogate, with the help of the physician and hospital, will have to
find another physician to render care.209  If, after the ten days (or the
extended period), no willing physician was found, the attending physi-
cian may cease aggressive medical treatment210 and is shielded from
liability.211  If, however, the parties were able to locate a willing phy-
201. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.001–166.166 (West 2010).
202. For a look at some other state statutes, see supra notes 36, 37, 39.
203. See Martin L. Smith et al., Texas Hospitals’ Experience with the Texas Advance
Directives Act, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1271 (2007).
204. The purpose of this section is to address the efficacy of TADA as a response to the
problem of medical futility.  Accordingly, I have made no attempt to analyze the
statute on legal grounds or explore the case law generated by TADA.  It is note-
worthy that the constitutionality of this statute has been questioned on the
grounds that its safe harbor provision violates the dictates of procedural due pro-
cess. See generally, e.g., Nora O’Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconsti-
tutional Medical Futility Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60
BAYLOR L. REV. 527 (2008).
205. Smith et al., supra note 203, at 1272.
206. Id. at 1271–72.
207. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.046, 166.052(a) (West 2010).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. § 166.045(d); Sadath A. Sayeed, The Marginally Viable Newborn: Legal Chal-
lenges, Conceptual Inadequacies, and Reasonableness, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
600, 604 (2006).
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sician, the hospital will arrange to transfer the patient at the patient’s
expense.212
From 1999 to 2004, hospitals reported 178 TADA cases in which
the reviewing committee agreed with the attending physician’s deci-
sion to withhold treatment.213  Of those, the status of eight patients
(less than 5%) improved sufficiently to warrant a reversal of the physi-
cian’s recommendation prior to the conclusion of the ten-day waiting
period.214  Astonishingly, those eight cases were concentrated in just
three hospitals,215 suggesting that the review processes in these hos-
pitals were inadequate.  In all three hospitals, the review committee,
so designated under TADA, was simply the hospital’s general ethics
committee and was not necessarily counseled by competent medical
personnel.216  TADA does not specify who must sit on the review com-
mittee and, as a result, a great deal of disparity exists among the sur-
veyed hospitals.217  For example, physicians were not represented in
3% of committees, ethicists were present on just 45%, lawyers on 42%,
clergy on approximately 16%, social workers on approximately 13%,
and people identified as “patient advocate[s]” on less than 1%.218
The survey reported 187219 cases in which the reviewing commit-
tee agreed with the attending physician and resolution was achieved
before the ten-day statutory period expired.220  In 78 cases, the pa-
tient died within those ten days.221  Of the remaining 109 cases, 65%
of patients or surrogates who had previously opposed the physician’s
determination agreed to discontinue treatment, 28% transferred to
another healthcare facility, and the health of 7% improved.222  These
numbers are significant for at least two reasons.  First, they establish
that, for at least a significant minority of patients who desire to do so,
transfer to another hospital is a real option.  Some commentators pre-
viously hypothesized that “[w]hen both the treatment team and the
ethics committee come to the conclusion that further treatment is fu-
tile, it is extraordinarily unlikely that another facility will accept the
212. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (West 2010).
213. Smith et al., supra note 203, at 1274–75.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1272.
218. Id.
219. For an acknowledgement and possible resolution of the apparent incongruity be-
tween the statement that there were 178 total cases, see Smith, et al., supra note
203, at 1274–75 and supra note 213 with its accompanying text, and the present
statement that there were 187 cases which were resolved during the ten day pe-
riod, see Smith, et al., supra note 203, at 1273 (discussing how respondents may
have viewed listed outcomes as overlapping rather than mutually exclusive).
220. Smith et al., supra note 203 at 1274–75.
221. Id. at 1274 fig.1.
222. Id. at 1273, 1274 fig.1.
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patient.”223  This empirical study suggests that those commentators
were wrong; patients for whom treatment was deemed futile are often
able to find a physician who is willing to provide the treatment they
desire.224
Second, these data reveal that a significant number of patients or
surrogates who previously opposed their physicians so adamantly that
they forced their hospital through a complicated administrative proce-
dure simply changed their minds in response to the reviewing commit-
tee’s decision.  This either suggests that the TADA is effective in
communicating to patients or surrogates just how futile further treat-
ment would be, enabling them to come to terms with reality, or that
the fear of being unilaterally terminated after ten days is sufficiently
intimidating and coercive to make patients or surrogates submit to
the requests of physicians and agree to terminate treatment over their
own moral, religious, ethical, emotional, irrational, or other personal
objections.225
IV. ON INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE, BIAS, AND
MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHY
In the fall of 1995, Sonya Causey suffered complications during
childbirth, which left her a quadriplegic.226  Following transfer to a
nursing home where she developed respiratory distress in October
1996, she was transferred back to the Louisiana hospital where her
child was born–but this time she was in a coma.227  Her doctor said
that with dialysis and a ventilator she had a 1–5% chance of regaining
consciousness and, with treatment, was likely to survive another two
223. Robert L. Fine & Thomas W. Mayo, Letter to the Editor: The Rise and Fall of the
Futility Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1575, 1576 (2000); see also Daar, supra
note 50, at 1270 (referring to patients who cannot come to terms with their physi-
cians as “ethical hot potatoes” and stating that for these patients “transfer be-
comes a near impossibility”).
224. A reviewer of an earlier version of this Article inquired how the patients who
successfully transferred fared following their transfer.  I do not know the survival
rate although presume it to be at or close to 0%.  The success of the treatment is
not the point.  Rather, I merely try to show that the patients got what they
wanted: a chance.
225. See Fine & Mayo, supra note 223, at 1576 (stating that TADA helps “persuade
the family of the appropriateness” of palliative care).  This persuasion is not al-
ways benign.  “Indeed, Dr. [David A.] Asch added, most of the time doctors call
the shots.  ‘When you get patients to agree, there’s so much subtle or not so subtle
coercion’ he said.”  Kolata, supra note 32.  One physician rather candidly la-
mented that TADA “relies on a due-process approach that is more illusory than
real and that risks becoming a rubber-stamp mechanism for systematically over-
riding families’ requests that seem unreasonable.”  Robert D. Truog, Tracking
Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2007).
226. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 30732-CA, p. 2 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/26/98), 719
So.2d 1072, 1073 n.1 (La. App. 1998).
227. Id.
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years in a coma.228  He concluded that further treatment was of “no
benefit” and recommended withdrawing her from aggressive medical
care.229  Causey’s family objected and her doctor tried, unsuccessfully,
to transfer her to another medical facility.230  After consulting with
the hospital’s Morals and Ethics Board, Mrs. Causey’s physician re-
moved her feeding tube and ventilator.231  She died the same day after
just thirty-one years of life.232  Mrs. Causey’s family sued for damages
and the trial court found for the defendants, stating that they “acted
in accordance with professional opinions and professional
judgment.”233
As part of its analysis of the case, the appellate court contrasted
situations in which a patient requests treatment that is harmful or
literally has no effect and treatment that does have an effect but
which can confer no “benefit” to the patient.234  An extreme example
of the first type might involve performing a heart transplant for a pa-
tient with no cardiovascular problems and complaining of a headache.
Such a medical decision would have no effect on the patient’s condi-
tion, barring potential complications associated with surgery.235  It is
precisely because of the absence of possible effect that no reasonable
surgeon would consider performing such an operation.  In contrast,
many of the treatment plans labeled “futile,” including the medical
treatment requested by Mrs. Causey, present a reasonable—even if
unlikely—possibility of affecting the patient by extending her life.  As
reported above, the treatment proposed for Mrs. Causey was likely to
grant her an additional two years.236  By declaring such treatment
“futile,” Mrs. Causey’s physician rendered an opinion that is couched
not in the doctrines of medical science but rather in those of his per-
sonal moral code.  He believed that this treatment, which was likely to
have an effect, offered her no “benefit,” and ought not to be
provided.237
Any assessment rendered by any person of the benefits of medical
care likely to affect the dying process (perhaps by delaying the mo-
ment of death) will necessarily be “grounded in beliefs and values
about which people disagree.  Strictly speaking, if a physician can
keep the patient alive, such care is not medically or physiologically
228. Id. at p. 1, 719 So.2d at 1073.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at p. 2, 719 So.2d at 1074.
232. Id. at p. 2, 719 So.2d at 1073–74.
233. Id. at p. 1, 719 So.2d at 1073.
234. Id. at p. 3, 719 So.2d at 1074.
235. Id.
236. See id. at p. 1, 719 So.2d at 1073.
237. Id. at p. 2, 719 So.2d at 1073–74.
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‘futile.’”238  The Causey Court observed that “[f]utility is a subjective
and nebulous concept which . . . incorporates value judgments.  Obvi-
ously, in this case, subjective personal values of the benefit of prolong-
ing life with only a slight possibility of improvement dictated” the
decisions of Mrs. Causey’s physician and hospital.239  Despite these
insightful observations, the Causey Court found for the defendants,
stating that the decision by Mrs. Causey’s physician and hospital to
withdraw treatment constituted a “medical procedure” consistent with
prevailing standards of care and was therefore not negligent.240
Causey was not the first court to recognize that courts cannot judge
the value of human life in a quantitative or scientific manner.  In its
seminal Saikewicz decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts questioned whether it was appropriate to put a severely men-
tally retarded patient through a painful medical procedure in order to
extend his life.241  The court considered Mr. Saikewicz’s likely quality
of life following the suggested procedure and wrote, without elabora-
tion: “To the extent that this [analysis] equates the value of life with
any measure of the quality of life, we firmly reject it.”242  This Part
will show that the medical futility movement has adopted the position
expressly and “firmly” rejected in Saikewicz.
The first section will consider the various presumptions that un-
derlie futility assessments.  The second section will take a closer look
at bias within the medical community and will argue that it is quite
poorly equipped to assess requests for medical treatment that have no
justification within the field of its expertise.  Science is well equipped
to discover and describe the physical world, not to answer philosophi-
cal, metaphysical, normative, or moral questions.243  When a patient
appeals to a discipline outside the expertise of the medical community,
that community ought to have no opinion and any opinion that it ex-
presses ought to be suspect due to underlying bias.  Section three will
explore further the tension between theological philosophy and the
238. Id. at p. 3, So.2d at 1074.
239. Id. at p. 4, So.2d at 1075.
240. Id. at p. 7, So.2d at 1076.  The relevant standard was negligence because the
plaintiff premised her suit on the tort theory of negligence.  Had the plaintiff as-
serted a different theory (assuming necessary alterations of the relevant facts),
such as a violation of EMTALA, or perhaps intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, see supra sections III.B–D, the court could not have relied
solely on compliance with a customary standard of care and may have reached a
different result.
241. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423–24
(Mass. 1977).
242. Id. at 432.
243. For example, science describes the mechanism by which the addition of pure so-
dium to water results in a violent exothermic (explosive) reaction.  However, it is
beyond the capacity of that discipline to speculate why the combination of sodium
and water ought to be highly explosive.
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materialist philosophy that has been largely adopted by the medical
community.
A. The False Presumption of “Futility”
Doctors and hospitals making decisions in the name of medical fu-
tility have confused what should not be done with what cannot be
done.244 They have concluded that further treatment should not be
offered to the patient in question and thus proceed on the notion that
they are unable to provide that treatment.  This is a problem because
any discussion of what should or should not be done on behalf of a
terminal patient involves a moral judgment on the nature, function,
value, and purpose of human life.245  “[S]tating that a medical inter-
vention is futile only begs the question: why?  There can only be agree-
ment on so-called qualitative futility if all parties at the decision-
making table share the same assumptions about what gives life value
in the first place.”246  The physician approaches the question with his
life experience and moral code and then renders a decision based upon
those non-medical considerations that greatly handicaps the patient’s
autonomy and may be contrary to the teachings generated by the pa-
tient’s life experience and moral code.
Medical ethicists Robert M. Veatch and Carol Mason Spicer identi-
fied this problem.  They concluded that a clinician is not able to de-
scribe requested medical care as “futile” relying exclusively on his
medical expertise.247  They argue that declaring treatment “futile” is
meaningless as a matter of medical science.248  This is true, in part,
because it is virtually impossible for a clinician to conclude that a
given medical treatment will have absolutely no physiological ef-
fect.249  Rather, clinicians who declare “futility” often base their deci-
sions in statistics.250  Perhaps a given clinician declaring “futility” is
expressing his opinion that the requested care has less than a one in
one-hundred (or one in one-million) chance of achieving the desired
effect.251  But because the initial threshold question (what probability
of success is too little?) does not lend itself to absolute answers and
cannot be resolved scientifically, it is a normative judgment.252
Whether to draw the proverbial line at one in one-hundred, one in one-
million, or any other figure is to be determined by an appeal to some
244. See Sayeed, supra note 211, at 604.
245. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
246. Sayeed, supra note 211, at 604.
247. Robert M. Veatch & Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the
Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 16–17 (1992).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 17–18.
250. See id. at 18–19.
251. See id.
252. See id.
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external source, belief, or moral code.  Accordingly, the “futility” as-
sessment necessarily rests on a normative–non-scientific–judgment
rendered by the physician ad hoc, without peer review or input from
the patient.
Additionally, the value judgments that often underlie futility as-
sessments suffer from an hermeneutic problem.  Those who are more
inclined to value life for its own sake might set the requisite
probability many orders of magnitude higher than those who take a
more utilitarian approach to assigning value to human life.  Many pa-
tients facing death might find a one in one-hundred chance of recovery
to be extremely encouraging and would be inclined to demand treat-
ment.  Many physicians are likely to consider a one in one-hundred
chance not worth pursuing and thereby declare treatment to be “fu-
tile.”  Under such circumstances, the patient and physician do not
speak the same language.  For example, a given patient might be en-
couraged even by a one in one-million chance but, when hearing her
doctor declare that treatment is “futile” (which she assumes to mean
that there is no chance of success), she will abandon hope.253  This
failure to communicate does not merely obstruct efficient communica-
tion, it coerces patients into ill-informed decisions.
Perhaps one way to address both problems is by mandating com-
plete disclosure.  Rather than declaring a given treatment to be “fu-
tile,” physicians would be required to make an assessment on
probability of recovery and present that figure to the patient or surro-
gate.  While this would, in my view, represent an improvement in the
state of the law, it will not be satisfying for any party given the other
significant problems described in this Part.
Even when all parties are communicating effectively and effi-
ciently, a physician’s declaration of “futility” may have little meaning
for patients and legal decision-makers.  Frequently, a “futility” decla-
ration does not mean that the treatment will not achieve the desired
effect, but rather that the desired effect itself is either of no “benefit”
or does not justify the financial costs likely to be imposed on the medi-
cal provider.  There may be a very high probability of a particular
treatment generating a physiological effect, but the benefit of “pro-
253. Claims that physicians acting in this capacity avoid instilling “false hope” in the
family of a terminal patient and are thus helping the patient and her family pre-
pare for the inevitable are of no moment.  The value of a one in one-million
chance of living another year is dependent upon determining the value of life for
that year.  If the value of a year of life is exceptionally high, the value of a one in
one-million chance of living another year is also high and may be higher than the
costs associated with effectuating that chance.  Accordingly, the argument that a
one in one-million chance of another year of life is a false hope and, as a result,
physicians should avoid apprising their patients of the existence of that chance
simply places physicians in charge of valuing the lives of their patients—a task
that they are poorly suited to perform.
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longing death”254 is deemed low-value or may result in the diversion
of resources from other, more “deserving,” patients.255  The clinician
declaring “futility” in this context is making a value judgment, weigh-
ing the value of an extended life to his patient against the costs to that
patient, society, or others.  He is certainly entitled to his opinion, but
he has no normative authority to impose his position on his patient.256
The physician who declares a patent’s goals to be futile inflicts an
injury not just against the patient but also against the medical com-
munity itself and against society at large.  By rendering a value judg-
ment in the name of medicine (suggesting that some neutral principle
yields the physician’s “futility” conclusions), the physician teaches so-
ciety that the medical community’s medical determinations need not
always be taken seriously.  Some medical declarations are well-
founded in science.  Others are policy judgments disguised as scien-
tific conclusions.  But the physician makes no differentiation between
them.  The observer is left to decide whether a given medical declara-
tion is based on science, theology, ethics, or some other discipline.  The
public is thus taught to mistrust the medical community.  It would be
far more appropriate for a physician rendering a “futility” declaration
to declare the requested treatment “ ‘religiously inappropriate,’ ‘mor-
ally inappropriate,’ or even ‘socially inappropriate’”257 as doing so
would properly couch his opinion outside his field of expertise and
alert the patient and others that the physician’s opinion is a personal
judgment.
Some futility plans make value judgments more explicitly, as if
they are aware of the non-physicological implications of their deci-
sions.  A good example is the policy adopted by the UCLA Medical
Center in 1993.  The policy states initially that “some patients or sur-
rogates will not be offered treatment that they might want.”258  Up to
that point, the policy is no different from any other, but then the policy
discusses specific medical conditions.  Regarding a patient who is in a
persistent vegetative state, the policy declares:  “[N]o further medical
treatment need be offered because it could not be currently (or in the
future) meaningful to the patient.”259  Here again, the hospital is ren-
dering a non-medical decision.  The hospital would be fully justified in
declaring that further treatment will not help the patient recover, but
254. This phrase is borrowed from the proponents of withdrawing aggressive medical
treatment from futility patients.  Their decision to use the words “prolonging
death” is itself indicative of a value judgment, strongly suggesting that the pa-
tient is already conceptually dead.
255. See infra section IV.C.
256. For further elaboration on this point, see infra section IV.B.
257. See Veatch & Spicer supra note 247, at 21.
258. Daar, supra note 50, at 235.
259. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting UCLA Medical Center Life Sustaining Treatment
Policy, Policy No. 0027, at 2 (May 1, 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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it cannot declare that further treatment will or will not be “meaning-
ful” because that statement presumes a great deal that is not known
or knowable by science.  The medical providers who wrote the policy
were obviously unable to access the mental, psychological, and meta-
physical processes of a patient in a persistent vegetative state in order
to determine how the patient reacts to various forms of treatment on a
psychological, emotional, or spiritual level.
Similarly, we cannot fully understand what a human being goes
through at the moment of death and no patient is able to credibly com-
municate that process to us after experiencing it.  If the process is
emotionally, physically, or spiritually painful, it cannot be said that
delaying the process of death is without meaning.  And if one believes
in an afterlife, the time and circumstance in which a person enters the
afterlife hangs in the balance.  Certainly, under these assumptions,
the decision to continue treatment is full of meaning.  In any event,
treating a terminal “futile” patient cannot be presumed, without more,
to be “meaningless.”
This analysis is not merely semantic.  My use of language to drive
the discussion is more illustrative than determinative.  Indeed, there
is no consensus on an appropriate working definition for “futility.”260
Nevertheless, the American Medical Association (AMA) put forward a
good composite that seems to capture what the various theories of fu-
tility attempt to achieve.261  It argued succinctly that all medical in-
tervention that had the primary purpose of simply “prolonging death,”
with no other physiological benefit, should be avoided because it con-
fers no benefit.262  The problem with this approach is that no person
or group has successfully explained why prolonging death (or ex-
tending life?) is not beneficial.  If, in fact, extending life is an admira-
ble goal, the AMA’s policy is unjustified.  Of course, it is very difficult
for us to know whether extending life has any independent value.  The
futility movement deals with this problem by simply assuming it
away, refusing to address the question.  But until that question—
which logically precedes the futility rhetoric—is answered, discus-
sions about “futility” cannot begin.
To be clear, notwithstanding my emphasis on the word “futility”
throughout this Article, my analysis is not at all dependent upon
whether actors relying upon a doctrine of medical futility actually use
the word “futility.”  The recent trend is not to use value-laden words
like “futile” and “futility.”263  Indeed, TADA does not contain the
260. See, e.g., Helft et al., supra note 28.
261. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Medical Futility in
End-of-Life Care: Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 281
JAMA 937 (1999) [hereinafter AMA Report].
262. See id. at 938.  For commentary, see supra note 254.
263. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.001–166.166 (West 2010).
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words “futile” or “futility.”264  This is, of course, a rhetorical decision
probably motivated by a realization that the word “futile” is unpopu-
lar.  The use of different words to discuss “futility” is a mere cosmetic
change, as my discussion in Part III suggests.  The faulty presump-
tions that underlie “medical futility” are present regardless of whether
those making the presumptions ever use the word “futility.”  Window
dressing, as such, ought not to obfuscate our analysis.
B. Institutional Incompetence and Bias in the Medical
Profession
This section, building upon the prior one, will explore further the
institutional competence of the medical profession and inquire
whether physicians, as a community, have the capacity to answer fu-
tility questions.
The institutional competence of the medical profession extends to
matters of physiology, psychology, and medicine.  That is, after all, the
particular expertise of physicians.  Education in ethics and philosophy
or instruction on the differing worldviews that various patients might
bring with them into a doctor-patient relationship is dramatically
lacking from medical education.  No doubt, the medical community ac-
knowledges the importance that ethics plays in the practice of
medicine in the twenty-first century.  This is reflected by the fact that
the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME), the national
crediting authority for M.D. programs, requires medical schools to in-
clude bioethics in their curricula.265  But not all schools have a course
dedicated to that purpose and on average, medical schools require just
35.6 hours of bioethics instruction, with some schools reporting as few
as 9 hours of required instruction.266  Similarly, the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) wrote in 2008 that on average, its
126 affiliated schools provide 19.2 mandatory “sessions” on “medical
ethics” (without specifying the number of hours in a session).267  Fur-
ther, it appears that no medical school requires instruction in philoso-
264. Id.
265. See Govind C. Persad et al, The Current State of Medical School Education in
Bioethics, Health Law, and Health Economics, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89
(2008).
266. Id. at 90.  The researchers surveyed all 125 schools affiliated with the Association
of American Medical Colleges (AAMC). Id. at 90–91.  Of those, fifty-nine re-
sponded with data that the researchers could use. Id.  They reported a range in
bioethics instruction of 9–125 mandatory hours with a median of just 27.5 hours
and a mean of 35.6 hours. Id. For schools that did not have a dedicated course in
bioethics, the mean falls to just 34.4 hours of bioethics instruction. Id.
267. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., 2008 LCME PART II ANNUAL MEDICAL SCHOOL QUES-
TIONNAIRE, discussed in E-mail from Barbara Barzansky, LCME Sec’y, Dir. Un-
dergraduate Med. Educ., to Christopher Kortum, Exec. Editor, NEBRASKA LAW
REVIEW (Mar. 10, 2011, 09:29 CST) (on file with author).
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phy or the worldviews and philosophical positions of their patients.268
And while 83 of the 126 AAMC schools have mandatory instruction on
“gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) health issues” (with-
out elaboration), none appear to have mandatory instruction in “relig-
ious health issues.”269
Thirty-six hours of bioethics instruction does not make physicians
experts in medical ethics.  It certainly does not make them expert in
ethics defined more broadly.  Or of philosophy.  While their back-
ground in medical school is likely to make them sensitive to relevant
issues, they have no particular competence through which to opine on
the ethical questions that pervade futility cases.
Rather, the expertise of physicians permits them to opine on
whether and how a patient might recover.  If a competent physician
feels that the patient is highly unlikely to experience a physiological
recovery, his opinion should be taken seriously and factored into the
patient’s ultimate decision.  But the physician’s opinion should not be
given artificial significance by attaching to it some normative author-
ity not due to the physician as a result of his office.
Further, the medical community’s ethical conclusions frequently
do not comport with the moral and ethical positions of the population
that the medical community seeks to represent.  America is a very di-
verse country that is home to many religious people.270  Indeed, over
80% of Americans pray at least a few times a month.271  While ethics
is not, and should not be, a popularity contest, an ethical code imposed
upon society must attempt to accurately represent the positions of
that society.  Yet, many religious thinkers, among others, seem to find
that the prevailing ethics surrounding end-of-life medical care is gen-
erally not consistent with their theology.272
Perhaps the reason for the tendency of many members of the medi-
cal community to conflate their normative views with their medical
expertise lies in a misconception regarding how to define recovery
268. Id. While all schools have required instruction in “cultural diversity,” that ap-
pears to refer to racial and ethnic diversity rather than to philosophical diversity.
See, e.g., Center for the Study of Cultural Diversity in Healthcare, http://cdh.
med.wisc.edu/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
269. Supra note 267.
270. Indeed, America is “the most religiously diverse place on earth, and, among de-
veloped nations, the most religious.”  Charles C. Haynes, From Battleground to
Common Ground: Religion in the Public Square of 21st Century America, in RE-
LIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE: LIVING WITH OUR DEEPEST DIFFERENCES 97
(Azizah Y. Al-Hibri et al. eds., 2001).
271. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY, RELIG-
IOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 177 (question 41) (2008) [herinafter PEW
SURVEY], available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-land
scape-study-full.pdf; see infra notes 281–87 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Wesley J. Smith, Does Human Life Have Intrinsic Value Merely Because
it is Human?, 13 TRINITY L. REV. 45, 95–101 (2006); infra section IV.C.
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from illness.  Physiological recovery from illness is not necessarily co-
extensive with total recovery from illness.  Total recovery is defined by
the patient or by appeal to the patient’s wishes and desires.  Many
individuals do not judge the value of an outcome exclusively by mea-
suring its physiological benefits.  For some, the value of a successful
medical procedure may be measured more by the patient’s ability to
communicate with family members than by the extent of the patient’s
purely physiological recovery.273  A “futility” assessment should take
into account psychological and emotional measures of recovery, to the
extent that they are valuable to the patient.  But the biases internal to
and largely created by the daily practice of medicine may influence the
decisions of medical providers in ways that are not consistent with the
moral positions of society or with the definition of total recovery as I
have advanced it here.274
This point might be characterized as advocating a “goals oriented
analysis.”  Essentially, success and failure are defined not with re-
spect to some objective standard—i.e., normal physiological function—
but some subjective goal set by the patient or surrogate.  If the goal is
to simply remain alive, then any treatment that sustains life is, by
definition, a complete success.  And if the objective is to help the pa-
tient, then the patient’s goals (as expressed by the patient or through
her surrogate) are the only goals that are morally relevant in a futility
analysis.
Physicians are trained to treat medical conditions with procedures
and devices that bring about physiological recovery.  Indeed, under
normal circumstances, treatment decisions are informed primarily
(perhaps exclusively) with the objective of physiological recovery in
mind.  Generally, the treatment that is most likely to bring about
physiological recovery is the one most beneficial to the patient and the
one that should be used.  As a result of their daily practice and the
necessity of their keen expertise in matters of physiology, they are
trained (both in school and by virtue of their experience) to approach
their patient’s medical needs primarily (perhaps exclusively) as physi-
ological episodes.  Given this approach to medicine and the socializa-
tion that occurs during medical education and practice, it is not
273. See AMA Report, supra note 261, at 938.  Perhaps the distinction between “physi-
ological recovery” and non-physiological benefit is a little subtle.  The ability to
communicate following debilitating illness undoubtedly requires physiological re-
covery.  One cannot speak if a whole slew of physiological systems are not func-
tioning properly.  However, the ability to communicate is characterized in large
part by processes that are psychological and emotional, not exclusively physiolog-
ical.  The ability to continue to engage in emotional interactions (which need not
necessarily involve verbal communication) may be extremely valuable to certain
patients, even if those patients never see meaningful physiological recovery.
274. I do not suggest that medical providers who have worked over the past nearly
twenty years to develop modern medical futility policies act in bad faith.
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surprising that when no treatment option is likely to facilitate physio-
logical recovery, the physician recommends that no treatment be pro-
vided.  But, in futility cases, the patent’s physiological concerns are
often not primary.  Once the patient (or the surrogate acting in her
stead) learns that she has virtually no chance of survival, purely phys-
iological concerns might entirely cease to be relevant.  The objective of
“prolonging death,” as it is so often referred to, is not necessarily a
physiological objective but might be an emotional one.  Under these
circumstances, using modern medical analysis to help advance the pa-
tient’s interests and assess treatment options is akin to using quan-
tum physics to understand Chaucer.  Just as quantum physics is not
properly matched with the Canterbury Tales, so too the normal pre-
sumptions of medical practice will not offer useful guidance in the
realm of medical futility.  In many futility cases, the patient’s emo-
tional, spiritual, or personal need to remain alive justifies particular
action that prevailing standards of care might not.  The physician who
desires to help effectuate his patient’s objectives would focus his atten-
tion at achieving his patient’s emotional or spiritual fulfillment,
whatever that might entail.
The absence of institutional competence in the medical profession
effects quite a bit more than the simple observation that the socializa-
tion of physicians has them trying to meet the wrong goals.  It is not
simply that individuals lack the capacity to answer futility questions
but rather that the institution does so.  The medical community’s en-
tire normative (and legal) authority is granted to them as a function of
its particular role as providers of medical treatment.  The role of a
hospital and the physicians who work within it is to treat pa-
tients–that is, to bring about a physiological or psychological recovery.
Perhaps the physicians and hospital personnel in a particular futility
case will be properly qualified (through sufficient training in a wide
variety of disciplines) to make relevant decisions regarding non-physi-
ological questions.  But that individualized training does not give the
physicians and hospital authority to deprive a patient of her auton-
omy; those actors must derive that authority from the role they play
within their social institution.275  In other words, if the profession has
no normative authority due to a lack of institutional expertise, indi-
viduals cannot assume authority even if they are sufficiently individu-
ally expert.  The hospital’s expertise and social function is in medicine,
not ethics.  It thus has no institutional authority to decide questions of
ethics to the extent that those decisions affect the autonomy of its pa-
tients (who, by extension, never consented to the authority of the hos-
pital to decide such questions).
275. If my assertion were not true, then a patient with a superior knowledge of law,
medicine, and ethics should have normative authority to overrule virtually any
decision that the hospital makes that affects her personally.
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Moreover, even assuming that physicians are sufficiently expert to
make the types of ethical decisions that present themselves in futility
cases, there is significant reason to fear that internal biases might
prevent them from rendering competent decisions.  Discrete social
groups, such as the community of physicians, exhibit unique patterns
of assessing value that may deviate somewhat from those of the gen-
eral population.276  Within the medical community in particular, this
observation takes on new meaning.
An anonymous 1998 survey by psychologist James H. Leuba asked
a group of randomly selected American scientists if they believed in “a
G[-]d in intellectual and affective communication with man . . . to
whom one may pray in expectation of receiving an answer.”277  Just
40% of all responding scientists stated that they believed in G-d as
defined.278  Among the members of the highly prestigious, influential,
and quasi-governmental National Academy of Science (NAS), just 10%
anonymously responded to Leuba’s question affirmatively.279  Among
biologists in the NAS, the number falls to an astounding 5%.280  By
contrast, the Pew Forum found in 2008 that 81% of Americans281 pray
at least a few times a month,282 80% of whom (65% of all respondents)
claim that they have in the past received a definite answer to their
prayers.283  Moreover, 92% of Americans believe in G-d or a “universal
spirit,”284 71% are “absolutely certain” in that belief,285 39% attend
religious services at least once a week (54% at least once a month),286
and 82% define religion as “important” in their lives.287
Leuba’s study can be interpreted in two mutually exclusive ways.
One can either conclude that close study of science leads an open mind
to the conclusion that religion is false (science yields atheism or agnos-
ticism) or, alternatively, that those who do not believe in G-d tend to
achieve greater levels of success as scientists (atheism yields science).
276. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 247, at 29.
277. Edward J. Larson & Larry Witham, Scientists and Religion in America, SCI. AM.,
Sept. 1999, at 89.  The orchestrator of this study chose to define G-d in this way
in an effort to conform the definition with his view of Christian theology. Id.
278. Id. at 90.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Six percent of respondents were non-citizens. PEW SURVEY, supra note 271, at
266 (question 61) (2008). These data include those non-citizens that participated
in the survey. Id.
282. Id. at 242 (question 41).
283. Id. at 252 (question 43c).
284. Id. at 227 (question 30).
285. Id. at 228 (question 31).
286. Id. at 219 (question 20).  Also, 38% pray several times each day. Id. at 242 (ques-
tion 41).
287. Id. at 220 (question 21).  Fifty-six percent say religion is “very important” while
26% say religion is “somewhat important.” Id. Together, those groups sum to
82%.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB103.txt unknown Seq: 36 12-AUG-11 13:41
36 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1
A closer look at the NAS appointment process may suggest the latter.
Congress created the NAS and appointed its first members in 1863.288
Since then, members of the academy appoint their successors.289  “Its
current membership . . . remains the closest thing to peerage in Amer-
ican science.”290  To the extent that NAS has become largely mono-
lithic on issues of social import, we might conclude that the bias of the
existing membership is preventing minority views from gaining a
voice in the community’s leadership.  Eminent journals, such as Sci-
ence, Nature, and the New England Journal of Medicine, have simi-
larly been shown in recent years to incorporate a great deal of
majoritarian editorial discretion in selecting pieces for peer review
(arguably in an effort to control intellectual debate) and in determin-
ing the degree of scrutiny to subject each paper to during the peer
review process.291
Additionally, there is considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting
that scientists who dissent on matters of social import are ostracized
from their community.292  Some commentators have observed that
this has resulted in self-censorship, causing an increasing number of
scientists to decline to dissent.  “In research universities, the religious
people keep their mouths shut . . . [a]nd the irreligious people discrim-
inate.  There’s a reward system to being irreligious in the upper eche-
lons [of science].”293  This phenomenon further inhibits the expression
of minority views on important issues.
These observations are buttressed by the absence of evidence sug-
gesting that the over-representation of atheists among the scientific
elite is explainable on the grounds that atheists make better scien-
tists.  Further, there is no suggestion that careful analysis of scientific
evidence necessitates the adoption of an atheist philosophy.  Indeed,
even the atheists in the scientific elite often do not use science to ex-
plain their atheism.  While there are notable exceptions, scientists
who reject religion tend to do so because they cannot reconcile the ex-
istence of G-d with “all this evil in the world” or simply cannot accept
“all that supernatural stuff.”294  These views, while certainly provid-
ing legitimate basis for a philosophical position, are not scientific.
288. Larson & Witham, supra note 277, at 90.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Kevin Shapiro, Lessons of the Cloning Scandal, COMMENTARY, Apr. 2006, at 62,
63.
292. See, e.g., Nature Publ’g Grp., Cast out from Class, 434 NATURE 1064, 1064 (2005);
EXPELLED: NO INTELLIGENCE ALLOWED (Premise Media Corporation 2008).
293. Larson & Witham, supra note 277, at 91 (quoting University of Washington soci-
ologist Rodney Stark) (internal quotation marks omitted).
294. Id. at 90–91 (citing an informal study by the leading evolutionary biologist and
Harvard professor Ernst Mayr, appointed to the NAS in 1954).
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Indeed, scientists are often very quick to say that science and relig-
ion occupy different spheres of knowledge, neither one being superior
to the other.  For example, the NAS recently declared that science and
religion rest in “different aspects of human experience” such that
“[a]ttempts to pit science and religion against each other create con-
troversy where none needs to exist.”295  As a result, it is very difficult
to accept the notion that scientists believe that their discipline has
somehow proven or disproven any form of religious dogma.296
It seems more plausible that the structure and organization of the
scientific community stifles minority views, particularly when they
are controversial.  If that is correct, it is all the more likely to be so
when the ‘fringe’ views come not from within the scientific community
but from without.  When patients attempt to dictate the course of
medical treatment to their physicians in a manner unpopular among
the elite in the medical community, we would expect the medical
community to react unfavorably.  While this hypothesis does not
suggest that the community of physicians operates in bad faith and
with improper motives, it raises legitimate doubt regarding their in-
stitutional objectivity.  Accordingly, it would seem that the medical
community, as a community, should not have the responsibility of
making important social decisions on behalf of the population at large,
at least where the questions that underlie the important social deci-
sions are non-medical.  Rather, significant moral questions such as
those presented in futility cases should belong to the larger society.297
TADA298 and similar popularly enacted statutes299 represent a
significant and positive shift away from physician-directed decision
making in these areas as the popularly elected legislature has as-
sumed the ability to make futility decisions (by appointing a proxy).
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, all such statutes grant decision-
making authority back to the community of physicians and hospi-
tals.300  While these statutes implicitly recognize that the questions
295. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. & INST. OF MED., SCIENCE, EVOLUTION, AND CREATIONISM 12
(2008).
296. Compare RICHARD DAWKINS, THE G[-]D DELUSION (2008) (arguing that evolution-
ary science disproves the existence of G-d) with STEPHEN C. MEYER ET AL., EX-
PLORE EVOLUTION (2007) (adopting a different approach to understanding the
same evidence).
297. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 247, at 29, 36.
298. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.001–166.166 (West 2010).
299. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-807 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN.
§ 5-611 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 14–15 (West 2004); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984 (McKinney 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808
(West, Westlaw through 2010 First Ex. Sess. and 2010 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2990 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess. 2010); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.060 (West 2002); See also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 5-
613 (West 2009) (pertaining to patient transfer).
300. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984 (McKinney 2007).
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that underlie futility cases are social and moral questions, and thus
ought to be decided by society, they grant decision-making authority
back to a professional community that lacks sufficient institutional
competence and might be subject to intolerable bias.  While that dele-
gation of power is presumably legitimate as a matter of constitutional
law, such a delegation of legal authority is not necessarily coextensive
with normative authority.  And, for the reasons that I have presented
throughout this section, the medical community lacks normative au-
thority in futility cases.
This discussion on bias and institutional incompetence is not
merely theoretical; it is demonstratively relevant in actual cases.
While a full exploration of the way bias and institutional incompe-
tence express themselves is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief
look at one example is in order.  The medical community debates how
to approach infant care.  There are many parties that have an interest
in the care of the infant and the question is whose interests should the
physician seek to actualize when there is a conflict: those of the par-
ents, the medical community, society at large, or those of the infant.
Many medical ethicists, although certainly not all, believe that the in-
terests of the infant are of paramount importance and must prevail
over all other interests.301  The question is obvious: how are doctors to
discern the best interest of the infant?  The best interests of the infant
are complex and certainly involve questions that are non-physiologi-
cal.  Someone trying to assess the best interest of any child who can-
not communicate would have to consider the residual effects of any
decision on the family and how those will impact on the child, the psy-
chological implications of either decision on the child, the ability of the
family to finance medical treatment or care for their child in the ab-
sence of medical treatment, spiritual or religious considerations, and a
host of other considerations that do not relate directly to the efficacy of
a particular treatment.  And if a “best interests” test simply means
ruling out certain procedures because they are clearly not “beneficial”
to a child, the implementation of such a test will require consensus
among reasonable well-meaning and disinterested people about what
constitutes unacceptable treatment.  There is no such consensus.302
Employing best interests to justify non-initiation of rescue treatment in this
context necessarily means accepting the parents’ and/or physician’s normative
assessment of the future value of a likely seriously disabled life, and accepting
their moral motivations for disregarding such a compromised state of human
301. For example, ethicist John Paris indicated that there is “strong consensus in the
medical, legal, and ethical literature that it is the best interests of the infant–not
the desires of parents or the determination of the physician–that must prevail in
the care of newborns.”  Sayeed, supra note 211, at 605 (quoting John J. Paris et
al., Ethical and Legal Issues, in ASSISTED VENTILATION OF THE NEWBORN 81 (J. P.
Goldsmith & E. H. Karotkin, eds., 4th ed. 2003)).
302. Id.
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existence. . . . One set of parents may view a particular disability as ‘worse
than death,’ while another set of parents would not.303
So what, precisely, are medical providers to do in light of this prob-
lem?  There are no purely medical answers.  But medical providers
cannot develop a treatment plan without adequate answers.  Indeed,
their patients require an answer.  Out of necessity, they will answer
the question, presumably in good faith, the best way they know how.
They will rely on their education, the pearls of wisdom they glean
from other doctors, their own presumptions, and their personal moral
code.  The conclusions derived from these sources are likely to differ
significantly from the preferences of society at large or those of the
particular patient whom  they represent.  It follows that the public in-
terest would be better served by asking a different institution to an-
swer the difficult questions that arise in futility cases.
C. Non-Materialist Considerations
While hardly dispositive of the broader question of how to resolve
futility disputes, understanding how spiritual and religious doctrines
might address the question of futility is informative.  This section
seeks to explore how Western spiritual and religious doctrines gener-
ally approach futility cases and to illustrate how vastly those doc-
trines differ from the conclusions embraced by the medical
community.  I proceed on the assumption that many of those in scien-
tific community who are vocal on social questions have adopted a (non-
scientific) philosophy known as “materialism,”304 which argues that
nothing exists in the universe but physical matter (and, presumably,
energy).305  This assumption is not without basis.  “Many atheists con-
303. Id. at 606–07 (quoting Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, ¶27, 256 Wis. 2d
472, 489, 647 N.W.2d 413, 421).
304. DINESH D’SOUZA, LIFE AFTER DEATH: THE EVIDENCE 10–11 (2009).  “[M]aterialism
. . . refers to the philosophical position that material reality is the only reality.
Materialists hold that there is only one kind of stuff that exists–material
stuff. . . . Even human beings and other living creatures are ultimately collections
of atoms and molecules.” Id. at 10.
305. Id.; see also Materialism—What Matters?, ALL ABOUT PHILOSOPHY, http://www.
allaboutphilosophy.org/materialism.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (discussing
the basic principles of materialism).  Not all scientists are philosophical material-
ists.  Certainly, science itself does not mandate an acceptance of materialism; ma-
terialism is a philosophy and exists outside the realm of science.  But it seems
that materialism has occupied much of science’s bandwidth for a good while and,
accordingly, it is fair to talk about modern science as having adopted material-
ism. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL
HISTORY 12 (1992) (describing Darwinian evolution as built upon “radical philo-
sophical content” that amount to a “challenge to a set of entrenched Western atti-
tudes,” among them being Darwin’s “consistent” application of a “philosophy of
materialism”); D’SOUZA, supra note 304, at 11. See generally GEORGE NOVACK,
THE ORIGINS OF MATERIALISM: THE EVOLUTION OF A SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF THE
WORLD (1979).
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sider . . . materialism to by synonymous with reason and science
. . . .”306  The influence that materialist thought has had on public
debates about scientific and medical issues is unmistakable.307  But it
is, nevertheless, not widely held by society nor is it part of our na-
tional culture.
The Declaration of Independence memorialized the belief held by
many of those highly influential men who founded our country that
G-d grants “unalienable Rights” which may not be denied by govern-
ment, and that the right to life rests among those rights.308  Thus,
part of the foundation of the United States, or at least part of the the-
ory that inspired its creation, was an acceptance of natural law (which
includes, as understood at the Founding, a natural right to life) and
the natural limitations therein restricting government from interject-
ing into certain arenas.309  While not without limitation, the notion
that individuals retain a right to life remains part of our fabric.  And
even where society recognizes an exception to the individual right to
life—most notably in the form of capital punishment—it does so with
a degree of trepidation as evidenced by extensive procedural limita-
tions that it places upon government.310
In the context of medical futility, there should similarly be a pre-
sumption that the right to life ought not to be circumscribed or de-
nied.311  The utility of a “futile” (that is, low probability) treatment
option must be weighed (according to its probability) against its ex-
pected benefits.  A low-probability venture that offers the potential of
vast rewards is a venture worthy of at least some investment.  If we
accept, by hypothesis, the notion that life is of intrinsic value, a dimin-
ished quality of life following treatment and recovery does not negate
that value.  It might diminish the value, but does not negate it.  And if
we start with the assumption that life is supremely valuable, perhaps
even a significant diminishment of that value would nevertheless not
render the expected value of the “futile” treatment to be less than its
costs.  Similarly, if we adopt other philosophical non-materialist ap-
proaches to the question of medical futility, the likelihood of physiolog-
ical success is but one of the factors that enters into the patient’s
analysis.  The patient or surrogate claiming a non-materialist interest
to continued aggressive treatment views the treatment as being help-
ful to achieving some other (perhaps religious or spiritual) end.
306. D’SOUZA, supra note 304, at 11.
307. See supra note 305.  For example, philosopher-scientist Richard Dawkins, an
avowed materialist, dominates the position of the scientific community in the In-
telligent Design debates.  Largely thanks to him, the lay audience has come to
associate evolution with materialism.
308. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
309. Smith, supra note 272, at 47–48.
310. See supra note 1. R
311. See generally Smith, supra note 272.
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Some ethicists have noted that it is unwise to apply a materialist
framework to a patient who believes in a religious theory.  They coun-
sel that permitting futile treatment to go on a few extra hours or days
(assuming that the patient is expected to die within that time) “is a
small price to pay to prevent emotional and spiritual devastation in a
survivor.”312  They further recognize that “[t]here are sincerely obser-
vant people whose religion teaches that preventable death must not be
allowed to happen” and are therefore obligated, as part of their relig-
ious teachings, to oppose efforts to discontinue treatment.313  But note
just how far this argument goes.  It is a pragmatic argument, recogniz-
ing that the emotional costs associated with ending “futile” care are, in
some cases, not worth their institutional or financial benefits.  How-
ever, when “futile” care would significantly prolong a patient’s life by,
say, two years (recall that Sonya Causey’s physician denied her access
to care that was likely to extend her life by two years),314 this prag-
matic argument would counsel for a different result, recognizing that
two years of additional care are too much for the medical profession to
concede in exchange for the emotional satisfaction of the patient’s
family.  The pragmatic approach is quite problematic, as I will
explain.
Some published court decisions suggest that the families315 of
these terminal patients view the withdrawal of life-sustaining
medicine as murder.316  The position that (generally well-meaning)
health care providers who turn off life-sustaining devises are “murder-
ers” is quite unpopular.  Almost without exception, the words “mur-
der” and “murderer” do not appear in scholarly works (in both the
medical and legal fields) on medical futility.  This suggests that propo-
nents of medical futility are unconcerned about the possibility that, as
a matter of theology or moral philosophy, they might be considered
murderers and their patients murder victims.  Assuming arguendo
that at least some theologies or moral philosophies view as murder the
termination of a critically ill patient for whom further medical care is
deemed “futile,” the futility movement should have to explain why (1)
as a matter of religious law, murder in this context is acceptable, (2)
religious law, so articulated, is wrong; permitting a patient to die in
the context of futility is not rightly viewed as murder, (3) in this lim-
312. See Joseph M. Foley, Letter to the Editor, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 81, 145 (1994).
313. Id.; see also supra notes 9–27 and accompanying text. R
314. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 30732-CA, p. 2 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/26/98), 719
So.2d 1072, 1073 (La. App. 1998); supra note 228 and accompanying text. .
315. Typically, futility patients are unable to express their views. I will explain below,
infra notes 334, 352–55 and accompanying text, why the positions of surrogates,
particularly where the surrogate is a family member, are relevant.
316. E.g., Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57, 63 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995)
(“The Rideouts heard the announcement and immediately rushed . . . hysterically
crying and screaming that their child had been murdered.” (emphasis added)).
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ited context, the murder of the critically ill is necessary for furthering
the public good, regardless of the general positions of religious law, or
(4) the positions of the medical community should generally be
adopted over the objections of religious dissenters (i.e., even if the act
is murder under a given theology, that theology is irrelevant as a mat-
ter of law and policy).  If we are to allow the proponents of medical
futility to force a theory upon society that is seen by many as immoral,
it should be required to respond in some fashion, such as by adopting
one of the four arguments set forth above.  But if the proponents of
medical futility are unable to provide cogent support for at least one of
the above propositions, it is unclear why a largely moral society per-
mits continued violation of the theology and philosophy of at least
some of its members.
More significantly, it is unclear why the proponents of medical fu-
tility should be permitted to impose their philosophical views upon in-
dividual patients who do not subscribe to those views.  The patient in
a terminal futility case is made to pay the highest imaginable price
simply because the physician disagrees with him.  If the physician is
able to transfer the patient to another willing physician, without
harming the interests of the patient in the process, he should be enti-
tled to do so.  But if he cannot, and the patient’s interests are squarely
at odds with the physician’s interests, it is at best unclear why the
physician should win that battle when it means the death of the
patient.317
Perhaps physicians who provide non-emergent care will counter
that their patients have entered into a voluntary relationship with
their physicians and, as a result, the physician cannot be expected to
divorce his personal belief system from his treatment of his patients.
This argument would have considerable merit, limiting my objections
to emergency care only, if physicians disclosed their beliefs to prospec-
tive patients before initiating treatment.  For example, if intake forms
stated in bold letters in a conspicuous manner that the physician does
not provide futile medical care, and assuming that the patient had the
ability to either negotiate the terms of the contract or to find a suitable
alternative physician, the physician can rightly decline to respond to
his patient’s religious objections in the course of treatment.  But
where the patient did not know and had no reason to know the physi-
cian’s beliefs and preferences, or had no ability to work around those
preferences ex ante, the physician who has accepted care of this pa-
tient must be accountable, at minimum, to answer the patient’s theo-
logical objections.
Before continuing, I must state that this is not a proper forum for
discussing and attempting to develop any particular theology.  Rather,
317. For further elaboration on this point, see infra section V.B.
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I will assume that the religious arguments that I will mention below
exist, are strongly held by some members of the population, and need
to be addressed by ethicists.  Great care must be taken to ensure that
religious positions, whatever they may be, are respected and not dis-
missed by the medical community absent a truly compelling justifica-
tion.  “People who have lived their whole lives in accordance with a
religious tradition should be accorded the courtesy—dare I say re-
spect—of living their last hours and days in accordance with that
tradition.”318
In weighing the value of human life, ethicists typically take two
approaches.  They state either that life has intrinsic value or that it
does not.  Those who say that human life has no intrinsic value must
consider whether human life has any value at all and, if it does, they
must define the basis of that value.  In other words, they must explain
what gives life its value if it has no intrinsic value.  One author articu-
lated this problem with refreshing clarity:  “If the hospital is on fire[,]
what justifies our decision to rescue the patients before the hospital
cat and the animals in the laboratories?”319
Bioethicists often take the position that the subjective quality of a
given life is what defines its value,320 notwithstanding the highly con-
troversial implications of that position.321  Life’s value is thus not in-
trinsic, but depends on something external to it: the ability to enjoy
one’s surroundings.  Using this approach, if a life is without quality,
either because it is wrought with pain or is limited by extreme cogni-
tive deficiency, the life is one without value.322
One variation of the quality-of-life approach to valuation, currently
in common practice in the United Kingdom, is known as “quality ad-
justed life years” (QALY).323  “The thrust of the QALY approach is to
apply numerical data to medical decision-making so as to allocate re-
sources to those procedures that maximize not just life-years, but
those life-years that are most ‘livable,’ most ‘human,’ or most ‘enjoya-
ble.’  Those magical numbers are then used to set central limits on
[health care] consumption . . . .”324  Devising a robust QALY scheme
preliminarily requires that the standard-setters answer a breathtak-
ingly large number of normative questions.  As a result, QALY is effec-
tively nothing more than an arbitrary means of answering
318. Marc D. Stern, “And You Shall Choose Life”—Futility and the Religious Duty to
Preserve Life, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 997, 1008 (1995).
319. John Harris, The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life, 9 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 293, 295 (1999).
320. See Smith, supra note 272, at 49–51.
321. See supra notes 228–62 and accompanying text.
322. See Smith, supra note 272, at 49–51.
323. See Meir Katz, Towards a New Moral Paradigm in Health Care Delivery: Ac-
counting for Individuals, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 78, 100 (2010).
324. Id.
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unanswerable questions using seemingly neutral language. (I have
analyzed the QALY approach at length elsewhere and incorporate
that discussion by reference.325)
Nevertheless, it seems to be intuitive to many that saving a life of
little quality is a low-value endeavor.  The persistence of this argu-
ment illustrates the pervasiveness of materialist thought in the end-
of-life arena.  But if, as I have argued, QALY and other similar vehi-
cles to value life on the basis of its perceived quality are internally
incoherent (because they rest on countless preliminary normative
judgments), the proponents of medical futility must find an external
logical basis to support their theory if it is to continue to resolve diffi-
cult questions of social import.
Similarly, if one rejects the materialist view and accepts that life
has intrinsic value, even if not infinite value, efforts to define or quan-
tify that value are elusive.  This is so because attempts to value life
implicitly presume that life can be commodified.  But the notion that
life itself is a commodity is intuitively false.  Indeed, commentators
have great difficulty dealing with the commodification of human body
parts, even if parted with consensually and in a manner that does not
undermine health.326  If so, coherency in medical futility is likewise
elusive.  Without some basis with which to assess the value of life, it is
virtually impossible to determine when efforts to save, preserve, or
extend that life are essentially valueless.
It is only when one subscribes to philosophical materialism, or
some variation thereof, and starts from the presumption that life has
no value, can the conclusions of the futility movement follow logically
without further external support.  But if life has no value, it is unclear
why we should ever expend effort or expense to preserve it.  Nearly
everyone believes that life has at least some value, whether intrinsic
or external.  But if external, what defines it?  And if intrinsic, how is it
to be assessed?
Many believe that life has infinite or nearly infinite value, defined
by some transcendental ideal or force.  When one starts from this pre-
sumption, the flaws inherent in the presumptions of medical futility
become more apparent.  If life has infinite or nearly infinite value, he-
roic measures to preserve it are not only appropriate, but expected.
325. See id. at 100–02, 104–07.
326. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End
America’s Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (2004); Linda C. Fentiman,
Marketing Mothers’ Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New
Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29 (2009); Pamela
Foohey, Paying Women for Their Eggs for use in Stem Cell Research, 30 PACE L.
REV. 900 (2010); Peter Halewood, On Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131 (2008); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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The philosophical belief that life has infinite or nearly infinite in-
trinsic value is hardly a periphery or fringe position.  I count among
the adherents of this view—that there exists a “higher law” or moral
philosophy that ought to inform our actions and legal standards—
Professors Prosser and Keeton:
[T]he law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obliga-
tion of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in
danger . . . . The remedy in such cases is left to the “higher law” and the “voice
of conscience,” which, in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffec-
tive either to prevent the harm or to compensate the victim.  Such decisions
are revolting to any moral sense.327
It is important to point out that natural law and natural rights
theory—which provide the theoretical basis for the infinite value the-
sis—are not theology.  They are rooted in philosophy and are widely
held.328
Indeed, [references to G-d as a source of Natural Law or natural rights theory]
have been [made] by Bracton, Coke, Blackstone, Washington, Hamilton,
Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln[, some of whom were deists or perhaps not relig-
ious at all,] . . .  to recognize that the rights of every person are rooted in a
source outside of, and prior to, the State.  The [deity] they referred to was the
Philosophers’ G[-]d–the G[-]d that Aristotle, Avicenna, . . . Leibniz and others
derived from the structure of human reason itself.329
327. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56 at
375–76 (5th ed., 1988) (footnote omitted).
328. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1025–28 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that the 2002 Congress viewed the phrase “one Nation under G[-
]d” as representative of “the political philosophy of the Founding Fathers that G[-
]d granted certain inalienable rights to the people which the government cannot
take away.”) (emphasis added).
329. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss of Defendant-Intervenors
Muriel Cyrus, et al. at 5, Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist.,
665 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.N.H. 2009) (No. 07-cv-356-SM), 2008 WL 7296496 (cita-
tions omitted) [hereinafter Muriel Cyrus Memo]; see also THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 2 (stating all men are “endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights”); James Madison et al., Address to the States by the
United States in Congress Assembled (Apr. 26, 1783), reprinted in 1 DEBATES ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 96, 100 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836) (“[I]t has ever been the pride and boast of America, that the rights for
which she contended were the rights of human nature.”); ARISTOTLE, METAPHYS-
ICS bk. XIII, ch.7 at 1072, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 277, 318–20
(Richard McKeon, ed., 2d. ed. 1973) (“The first mover, then, exists of necessity;
and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this
sense a first principle.”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38, *41 (stat-
ing the law of nature “is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all
times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to [it]”); 2 BRACTON ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 33 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne
ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (“The king must not be under man but
under G[-]d and under the law, because law makes the king.”); RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 60 (The New Penguin Press 2004) (“The sacred rights of
mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records.
They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature by
the hand of the divinity itself and can never be erased or obscured by mortal
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These philosophies define themselves by appeal to a power that is
higher than the state.330  That higher power might be G-d but it just
as plausibly might be derived through reason and logic.  Philosophy is
accessible to people regardless of religious belief.  The view that life
has intrinsic value is held by an overwhelmingly large percentage of
the population331 and ought not to be discounted.
Objections to medical futility seem even more pronounced for those
who subscribe to variations of theology or moral philosophy that de-
scribe the interaction between body and soul.  If the human soul is
what makes a human being different from the hospital’s cat,332 al-
lowing a person to die in the name of medical futility may be no less
acceptable then permitting a healthy person to drown.  In both in-
stances, the observer is permitting the soul, which, by hypothesis,
grants this person his uniqueness, to depart from his body.  The fact
that the former was already sick and the latter not should not affect
that analysis.  If we assume, as many religious people seem to, that
the soul remains present and “aware” even in the bodies of those who
appear unresponsive (such as those in a persistent vegetative state),
the departure of the soul from the body is not a less significant or less
painful event.  Further, for various theological reasons, this interac-
tion between body and soul may be valuable, even if the body is to
remain forever unresponsive.  By ending this person’s life, a physician
power.” (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Farmer Refuted (1775), reprinted in
1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 86 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds.,
1961–1987))); 12 EDWARD COKE, COKE’S REPORTS *63, *64–65 (differentiating be-
tween the positive law of man and the universally endowed law of natural rea-
son); THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 225, 227 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)
(“[C]an the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their
only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of
the gift of G[-]d?”); JOEL L. KRAEMER, PHILOSOPHY IN THE RENAISSANCE OF ISLAM
288–89 & n.47 (Itamar Rabinovich et al. eds., 1986) (“[T]here exists some mover
that does not move in any respect.”); Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the
Dedication of the Cemetery of Gettysburg, Final Text, reprinted in 7 THE COL-
LECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“[T]his
nation, under G[-]d, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of
the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”); George
Washington, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in DAVIS NEWTON LOTT, THE
PRESIDENTS SPEAK: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS,
FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 3, 4 (M. Hunter & H. Hunter
eds., Olive Grove Publ’g, 4th ed. 2002) (“[I]t would be peculiarly improper to omit
in this first official act my fervent supplications to [G-d].”).
330. See Muriel Cyrus Memo, supra note 329 (arguing that the phrase “under G[-]d” in
the Pledge of Allegiance is a political philosophy rather than a theological
statement).
331. The vast majority of Americans are religious. See supra notes 270–287 and ac-
companying text. It stands to reason that a good number of those who are not
religious subscribe to a moral philosophy that governs the present analysis.
332. My reference to the hospital cat is taken from Harris, supra note 319.
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is depriving this person of a potentially positive spiritual experience.
For that reason alone, physicians and ethicists should think twice
before declaring that medical treatment has no “benefit,” is “futile,” or
must be discontinued for some other reason.
Given that (a) it is difficult to reconcile supernatural and non-ma-
terialist approaches of thought with medical futility, (b) giving norma-
tive preference to materialist approaches over non-materialist ones is
beyond the competence of medical science, (c) those who reject such
theories likely constitute a small minority of the population (even if a
majority within the medical community), and (d) the proponents of
medical futility often have no means of assessing or accessing the vari-
ous philosophical or theological positions that might motivate their
patients and/or surrogates, we should be slow to impose medical futil-
ity on those who reject it.  Indeed, physicians who wish to impose med-
ical futility on a patient who has a well-developed moral, religious,
ethical, emotional, or other subjective but well-considered preferences
that do not tolerate the termination of treatment should take pause
and consider the social implications of his proposed counter-
majoritarian imposition.
For those patients who do not have a comprehensive theory regard-
ing the end of life and relationship between body and soul, a discus-
sion on the likely success of various medical treatments is very much
in order.  Physicians should inform patients about the knowledge they
have as a function of their expertise: the likelihood of success, the
likely benefits, and the likely burdens of different forms of medical
treatment.  Patients should know not just what their options are, but
which options have merit as a matter of medical science and which
ones represent little more than a hope or a wish.  But that does not
yield the strong argument of medical futility: that physicians have the
unilateral right (given certain prerequisites)333 to withhold or termi-
nate “futile” medical treatment.
Rather, the patient’s interests should be routinely preferred in fu-
tility cases over the objections of his physician.  In the case of a surro-
gate, when it is plausible that a surrogate’s requests represent the
moral, religious, ethical, emotional, or other subjective positions of the
patient (and they often do because the surrogate is a often a close fam-
ily member and likely knows the patient well), the surrogate stands in
place of the patient to articulate the patient’s position on moral and
ethical questions.334  Those wishes should likewise be honored.
333. For a discussion on the positive law surrounding medical futility, see supra Part
III.
334. Both the Supreme Court’s majority opinion and Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), argued
that the true preferences of a patient can potentially be ascertained by listening
to the surrogate and that those preferences should be actualized.  The opinions
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When the surrogate’s ability to accurately represent the patient is
highly doubtful, physicians may have some normative basis to inter-
ject their beliefs and preferences.  But this is a rare exception, not the
rule.335
Of course, physicians do have a substantial and indispensible role
to play in guiding their patients.  They assess their patient’s physio-
logical state and make recommendations regarding various treatment
options.  By virtue of their proximity to their patient and as a result of
their role as the bearer of bad news in futility and terminal cases, they
also should be expected to provide emotional support to patients and
their families and counsel them on how to deal with their difficult cir-
cumstances.  They might also make recommendations regarding fur-
ther treatment.  Nothing in this Article is meant to suggest that
physicians should abandon their role as counsel to their patients.
only disagree about whether a state may (1) impose particular “safeguards” to
ensure accuracy and (2) assert that the default presumption for those in persis-
tent vegetative state for patients in a persistent vegetative state is to sustain life
rather than to end it. Compare id. at 279–80 (“[W]e assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. . . . Such a ‘right’ must be exer-
cised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.  Here, Missouri has in effect
recognized that under certain circumstances a surrogate may act for the patient
. . . but it has established a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while
competent.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 312–16 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Whatever a State’s possible interest in mandating life-support treatment under
other circumstances, there is no good to be obtained here by Missouri’s insistence
that Nancy Cruzan remain on life-support systems if it is indeed her wish not to
do so. . . . [I]f and when it is determined that Nancy Cruzan would want to con-
tinue treatment, the State may legitimately assert an interest in providing that
treatment. . . . Accuracy, therefore, must be our touchstone.” (emphasis added)).
For some reason, this point seems to give people some trouble. I do not under-
stand why. If the family member is trustworthy and has sufficient basis to articu-
late the patient’s positions, why is the family member less qualified to state those
positions than the patient herself?  And if the family member is not trustworthy
or does not have a sufficient basis to articulate the patient’s position, the family
member is not a good surrogate and it should be obvious that we ought not do as
the family member requests.  In either case, the question is purely factual, not
normative.  For further elaboration, see infra notes 352–55 and accompanying
text.  The matter is less clear when the patient was never physically able to artic-
ulate any particular position (such as with infants and mentally handicapped pa-
tients).  There too, however, I see no reason not to listen to the surrogate at least
where the surrogate is a parent or legal guardian.  Parents and legal guardians
have legal and moral authority to make decisions for their children.  That author-
ity extends to decisions that relate the moral philosophy, the meaning of life, and
spiritual or religious obligations (to the extent that they exist).  Why, then,
should that same parent or guardian not be able to articulate the “interests” of
the patient in the context of medical futility?
335. See the discussion regarding In re Wanglie, supra notes 51–58 and accompanying
text.
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But patients must be aware that their physician’s recommenda-
tions are “overflowing with normative judgment.”336  A physician that
recommends only palliative care, in light of the “futility” of further
aggressive treatment is taking a moral position, does so “from a posi-
tion of remarkable influence, and despite having no legitimate moral
expertise in this regard.”337  Patients and surrogates must be made
aware that their physicians are making normative arguments, that
there are implicit value judgments associated with those arguments,
that they are not obligated or expected to adopt those value judg-
ments, that they are encouraged to seek counsel from religious or spir-
itual leaders where appropriate, and that they ought not simply trust
their physician when deciding whether to terminate medical
treatment.
V. REBUTTAL AND RESPONSE
Proponents of the medical futility movement are likely to respond
to my arguments by stating that while medical futility may not be
perfect, is not without internal bias, and may discount the interests of
certain religious people, it is a necessity nonetheless.  The necessity of
a doctrine of medical futility is derived, they might say, from its ability
to solve significant social problems.  The three most persuasive argu-
ments that I have identified in the literature on medical futility fol-
lows: (1) By pursuing aggressive medical care, rather than focusing on
palliative treatment, we are putting our patients through unnecessary
physical and emotional pain, and that pain amounts to torture.338  As
the argument goes, even if the patients tell us that they want aggres-
sive treatment, it is not the job of a doctor to torture his patients.  (2)
By forcing physicians to act in accord with the will of their patients,
the physician is rendered a “medical vending machine” and essentially
puts the patient in the practice of medicine.339  The advocates of the
medical futility movement claim that a physician must be returned to
his position as an independent and moral agent of the medical profes-
sion and that adhering to a doctrine of medical futility moves the phy-
sician in that direction.340  (3) The exhaustion of medical resources on
patients who have no statistical chance of recovering is wasteful.341
And, given that society suffers from a shortage of medical resources, it
is affirmatively harmful to other, more deserving, patients.342  Rather
336. Sayeed, supra note 211, at 608.
337. Id. (emphasis added).
338. See, e.g., In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, *5, *20 (Mass. Prob. &
Fam. Ct. Mar. 22, 2004).
339. See Daar, supra note 50, at 1245.
340. See id.
341. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 247, at 17, 28–29.
342. See id. at 17.
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than capitulate to the desires of a particular patient or family, it is far
more efficient, as well as humane, to preserve these resources for fu-
ture patients who have the opportunity to fully recover.343  I will de-
velop and respond to each of these criticisms in turn. In short, all of
these criticisms revolve around the false presumptions and value
judgments discussed in Part IV that govern the medical futility move-
ment.  By exposing the presumptions and value judgments hidden in
each of these criticisms, I will demonstrate the failure of these argu-
ments and the propriety of allowing individual patients and surro-
gates to decide whether to receive life-sustaining medical care.
A. Human Suffering for a Purpose and with Consent Is Not
Torture
I came across a very powerful narrative arguing for the further-
ance of the futility movement by attaching a human face and a story to
the argument.  The narrative endeavors to convince readers that
human compassion can tolerate only one choice for patients in ex-
treme pain: palliative care (that is, supplying pain reliving medication
that offers no curative benefit).344  What makes this narrative partic-
ularly interesting for me is that it starts several years prior to the
cases that I discuss in this Article.  In the narrative, Mr. Smith is still
healthy and stands at the ultimate crossroads of his life.345  He is fac-
ing terminal cancer and must decide whether to treat his cancer with
the hope of extending his life or to opt for palliative care.346  What
should he do?
If Mr. Smith chooses aggressive treatment, he will continue to undergo chem-
otherapy that will cause vomiting, diarrhea, loss of hair, and permanent hos-
pitalization.  His liver will stop working and he will suffer dementia, jaundice,
kidney failure, a diminished immune system, rapid gastrointestinal bleeding,
an inability to breakdown proteins, and a loss of clotting factors.  To combat
these illnesses, Mr. Smith will be treated with dialysis, artificial nutrition,
blood transfusions, antibiotics, biopsies to test the advancement of the cancer,
and constant blood tests to monitor his blood levels.  Eventually Mr. Smith
may need intubation to help him breathe and restraints because of his demen-
tia.  He will probably develop bed sores from being bed-bound that will bleed
uncontrollably and may become infected, despite the regular doses of antibiot-
ics.  His condition will continue to deteriorate until he wastes away and dies
alone in a hospital intensive care unit (ICU), or with two family members, as
limited by ICU rules.  Mr. Smith’s other option is palliative treatment.  This
therapy will focus on easing his pain, and will allow Mr. Smith to say goodbye
to his loved ones and die at home, surrounded by family.  Under this alterna-
tive, Mr. Smith will be treated primarily with pain prevention and will die
343. See id.
344. Jon D. Feldhammer, Note, Medical Torture: End of Life Decision-Making in the
United Kingdom and United States, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 511–13
(2006).
345. Id. at 511.
346. Id.
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comfortably before most of the symptoms described above have progressed. . . .
Keeping someone with a terminal prognosis alive by extraordinary medical
means is tantamount to torture and degrades that person’s dignity.347
Certainly, the argument in favor of palliative treatment is a strong
one.  Extreme pain accompanied with little chance of benefit seems an
unconscionable combination.  But there lies the rub.  In order to estab-
lish that the pain is excessive in light of its potential gains, we must
first establish what those potential gains are.  Simply stating that
there is little to no chance of physiological recovery does not suggest
that there is little to no chance of benefit.  As discussed above,348 the
patient may obtain certain other benefits by prolonging her life.
Those benefits might not be cognizable by physicians, but that fact
does not make them any less objectively significant or subjectively val-
uable.  Additionally, there are benefits to family members that are
cognizable, such as the knowledge that they have done the “right”
thing, as per their subjective definitions, on behalf of their family
member.349
To the extent that the patient or surrogate sees benefit in the re-
quested medical treatment, it makes little sense for a physician to im-
pose his judgment on the patient.  That the physician deems
treatment to be “torture” is not grounds to withdraw treatment when
the physician retains little or no expertise enabling him to opine on
the nature or value of the perceived benefit.350
Of course, if the physician feels that his patient is making a cogni-
tive error, he should advise the patient and give her any data and
other information that might help her make a more informed decision.
But his assessment that she is making an uninformed–even a fool-
ish–decision does not make further treatment torture.  For even in
cases of unspeakable pain, if the patient honestly wants351 that pain,
given her belief that it is good for her, it cannot be labeled torture.
347. Id. (citations omitted).
348. See supra sections IV.B–C.
349. See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text.
350. Note the limits of this argument.  I am saying only that the physician’s defini-
tions do not provide grounds to cease treatment.  I am not saying that the physi-
cian therefore has an affirmative obligation to treat.  If the physician has the
capacity to transfer his patient to another physician who wants to provide treat-
ment, I see no objection to permitting the physician to insist upon such a transfer
(even over the protests of the patient).  If, however, the physician is not able to
facilitate a transfer (perhaps because no other physician is willing to provide
treatment), I believe the physician would be obligated to provide treatment (per-
haps unless the physician presents a true conscientious objection). See infra sec-
tion V.B.
351. This argument only works to the extent that the sanity of the patient is not legiti-
mately in question.  Where there are reasons to believe that the patient does not
have the capacity to make decisions for herself, the arguments in this paragraph
are not applicable.  I should note that religious motivations and other motivating
factors that are not purely rational in the mode of, say, Richard Dawkins, see
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If a surrogate, rather than the patient herself, is demanding pain-
ful treatment, the question appears far more difficult.  But as noted
above,352 the difficultly is not normative or theoretical but purely fac-
tual.  If the surrogate is accurately stating the positions of the patient,
then the surrogate’s request for additional treatment must be ac-
cepted as the patient’s claims.  And where there are serious doubts353
that the surrogate is accurately expressing the will of the patient,
than the surrogate’s demands must either be rejected or partially dis-
counted.  Where the surrogate is a family member and is expressing
the strongly held beliefs of the patient (as the patient articulated them
while she had the capacity to do so), it is hard to imagine a case in
which the ability of the surrogate to speak for the patient is honestly
in doubt.354  And where the patient never had the capacity to articu-
late her beliefs (perhaps because she is an infant or mentally handi-
capped), the parent or legal guardian who has legal and moral
authority to decide all types of philosophical and moral questions for
the patient should have no less authority to do so here.355  Accord-
ingly, in the vast majority of cases, where a surrogate demands treat-
ment that the physician deems to be “torture,” the physician would
not be permitted to withdraw treatment on that basis alone.
Notwithstanding my arguments above, or perhaps without consid-
ering them, many physicians have adopted the “torture” argument.  I
believe that it is useful to explore two real cases to understand how
the argument is applied and appreciate how the subtle value judg-
ments that underlie this argument make a material difference in the
lives of some patients.
As set forth in Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Medical Center,356  Baby
Ryan was born with medical abnormalities so severe that his doctors
decided to discontinue aggressive medical treatment.  Over the objec-
tions of Ryan’s parents, the doctors unilaterally removed him from his
DAWKINS, supra note 296, are not a mark of insanity, as some might suggest.  The
suggestion is both insulting and hostilely dismissive.  Any attempt to label a pa-
tient insane because she is requesting benefits not cognizable by medical science
must be promptly rejected.
352. Supra note 334 and accompanying text.
353. The fact that the physician disagrees with the surrogate does not create reasona-
ble doubt as to the surrogate’s ability to speak for the patient.
354. See the discussion above regarding In re Wanglie, supra notes 51–58 and accom-
panying text.  If the surrogate has a financial incentive to keep the patient alive,
that might create a reasonable doubt as to the surrogate’s credibility.  But that
too would be a highly factual question depending upon all the relevant circum-
stances.  Note that keeping the patient alive is typically to the surrogate’s finan-
cial detriment.
355. See supra note 334 (discussing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990)).
356. 987 P.2d 634 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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dialysis machine, which he vitally required for survival.357  He re-
mained detached from the dialysis machine for eleven days, which,
according to his parents, caused his condition to deteriorate signifi-
cantly.358  Ryan’s parents obtained an injunction compelling dialysis,
ending the eleven-day period.359  They claimed that he never fully re-
covered from the trauma he suffered over those eleven days, which
ultimately lead to his death some four years later.360  Later, the hospi-
tal sued Ryan’s parents for inhumane treatment of their young
child.361  They claimed that the insistence of Ryan’s parents to con-
tinue dialysis was akin to child abuse by prolonging Ryan’s “undue
pain and suffering” and that the state needed to step in to prevent
continued abuse.362  The “abusive” treatments that the parents in-
sisted upon extended Ryan’s life by over four years, during which time
he was able to go home and lead a relatively normal life.363  Presuma-
bly, the hospital did not anticipate that result.  The hospital’s primary
error was not its failure to accurately assess Ryan’s ability to recover
from his condition–perhaps their conclusion was statistically correct
and conforming with prevailing standards and conventions–but in un-
dervaluing (relative to the position of Ryan’s parents) the possibility of
recovery.  They presumably undervalued the possibility of Ryan’s re-
covery because they valued another year (or four years) of Ryan’s life
dramatically differently than did Ryan’s parents.364  Who was right?
I don’t know that it matters.  The dispositive question here is whether
the hospital, a provider of medical services, should even have a seat at
that table.  The proper valuation of another year of Ryan’s life is not a
physiological question; nor is it a question that the hospital has the
normative authority to answer.
In some cases, the argument that a patient is being “tortured” by
her family is ultimately more understandable.  For example, consider
the tragic case of Barbara Howe.  Barbara’s health care agent, who
was also her daughter, insisted on continued treatment despite Bar-
bara’s need to have one eye removed and the other taped shut most of
the day.365  Barbara also suffered rib and arm bone fractures which
357. Id. at 635.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 635.
360. See id.  The parents brought claims against the hospital for lack of informed con-
sent and negligent prenatal, labor, and delivery care, but lost on summary judg-
ment and were denied the opportunity to amend their complaint to add a claim
for outrage. Id. at 638.
361. Ostrom, supra note 194.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See  Veatch & Spicer, supra note 247, at 18–19.
365. In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, *11–12 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct.
Dept. Mar. 22, 2004); see also infra notes 386–403 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing In re Howe in the context of physician autonomy).
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“occurred in the course of usual care, such as turning her on her side
or moving her up in the bed.”366  The hospital issued a statement in
response to Barbara’s daughter’s requests: “It is not our goal to end
Mrs. Howe’s life, but rather to cease care that is inappropriate and
harmful, indeed inhumane . . . [and that continuing care is] inconsis-
tent with the first tenet of our Hippocratic Oath, ‘Do no harm.’”367
Even in extreme circumstances such as these, the question of
whether Barbara’s medical care qualifies as “torture,” “inappropriate,”
“harmful,” or “inhumane,” rather than a terrible condition of being
human known as “human suffering,” depends nearly exclusively on
the answer to the following question:  Was prolonging the life of Bar-
bara Howe sufficiently valuable in its own right?  If it was, the pain
that she needed to suffer to get there provided her physicians no basis
to deny her that opportunity.  Just as in the case of Baby Ryan, Bar-
bara’s hospital had no capacity to answer or evaluate the underlying
and dispositive question regarding the nature and extent of value ren-
dered to her via medical treatment.368  The question is a deeply per-
sonal one.  In the present case, Barbara’s daughter, in an attempt
(presumably in good faith)369 to actualize Barbara’s wishes, chose
life.370  She said following Barbara’s death that it was important to
Barbara that she remain alive until the point at which “G[-]d was
ready to take her.”371  She continued, “my family and I are pleased
that her medical wishes were respected in life, as well as in death.”372
Others likely would have chosen a different path.  That personal deci-
sion must be left to them.
B. ‘Physician Autonomy’ Does Not Define the Scope of a
Physician’s Legal Responsibilities
Barring a compelling need, medical providers should not be re-
quired to render medical care that they subjectively believe to be tor-
ture, or object to on other grounds.  Physicians are not machines; they
have positions of their own.  And while their profession does not grant
them the authority to opine on questions regarding moral, religious,
366. In re Howe, 2004 WL 1446057 at *13.
367. Liz Kowalczyk, Plan to Take Woman off Life Support is Halted, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2005, at B1, B5.
368. See supra Part III. This argument does not imply that individual doctors are
therefore compelled to provide treatment. I address that question infra in section
V.B.
369. For a discussion on the reasonableness of Barbara’s daughter’s actions, see infra
notes 387–96 and accompanying text.
370. See In re Howe, 2004 WL 1446057.
371. Liz Kowalczyk, Woman Dies at MGH After Battle over Care: Daughter Fought for
Life Support, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2005, at A1.
372. Id.
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ethical, or emotional convictions,373 they have their own similar pref-
erences and it is not obvious that they should be required to sacrifice
those in favor of the preferences of their patients.
Accordingly, where a physician objects to treatment, the physician
should be permitted to transfer his patient to a willing competent phy-
sician even over the patient’s objections.  But where there is no compe-
tent physician who is willing to accept this patient, what is the
treating physician to do?  Ideally, these problems can be resolved con-
tractually, ex ante.  Physicians could put into their contracts, in a con-
spicuous manner, what they intend to do should continued aggressive
treatment of the patient become extremely unlikely to provide any ad-
ditional physical benefit.374  Provided that these contracts do not be-
come unenforceable contracts of adhesion in violation of public
policy,375 they would likely be useful in defining the obligations of the
physician in light of his personal objections.  Perhaps law can facili-
tate this by requiring physicians to negotiate ex ante and at arms-
length with prospective patients regarding the possibility of future
“futile” treatment.  Currently, to my knowledge, the law does not re-
quire such negotiation and, in any event, contracting is not possible in
the case of emergency care.  What should the rule be in the absence of
a valid and enforceable contract?
A rule respecting physician autonomy has much merit.  First, as I
discussed immediately above, physicians have moral and personal po-
sitions that ought to be respected no less than the moral and personal
positions of their patients.  Second, patients, as well as policy-makers,
373. See supra Part IV.
374. For any such agreement to be enforceable, the physician will have to take a great
deal of care in defining his terms.  The words “futile” and “unhelpful” are subject
to broad interpretation.  As I have argued, see supra Part IV, very little requested
medical treatment is actually “futile.”  Also, any appeal to empirical data needs to
provide clear definitions.  What is statistically a null set from the perspective of
the physician might be very good odds in the eyes of the patient.
375. In truth, most such contracts probably would be contracts of adhesion and would
violate public policy if the patient has no reasonable means of bargaining with
the physician or finding an alternative physician who will agree to the patient’s
terms. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 12 (1999) (stating that the “factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether a contract of adhesion is unconscionable include
whether the coerced party was on notice of the offending provision, whether the
coercing party achieved agreement by fraud or overreaching, whether any alter-
natives existed for the coerced party, the subject matter of the contract, the de-
gree of economic compulsion motivating the adhering party, and the public
interests affected by the contract.” (citations omitted)).  Physician’s contracts are
generally written by lawyers specifically hired by the physician for that purpose.
The contracts are generally not subject to negotiation and a patient who declines
to assent to one item on the contract will not receive treatment.  If patients are
not able to find out which qualified physicians are willing to meet their terms but
need prompt medical treatment, they will effectively have no choice but to accept
the contract in their hands.  As a matter of public policy, a contract signed on
those terms cannot be enforced. See id.
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must understand that “it is difficult for a health care team to work for
no positive end.”376  Medical providers presumably enter their profes-
sion for the purpose of helping people; when they are required to work
long hours and with great diligence for the purpose of harming an-
other (as they have subjectively defined their actions), we can expect
that they will become less effective, fatigued, and possibly imprudent
over time.377  Third, it may be unwise to undermine the judgment of
physicians because they are seen by the public and within their own
professional community as moral agents.378  Undermining their judg-
ment may challenge public perception and the manner in which the
physician sees himself, both of which could have deleterious conse-
quences.  Indeed, “[n]o rational patient would want unnecessarily to
have a physician providing care who feels that his or her moral con-
science is being violated.”379  Once the moral relationship between pa-
tient and physician is eroded, the physician is little more than a
purveyor of medical goods in which professional discretion is non-exis-
tent and the patient, rather than the physician she hired, is placed in
the position of practicing medicine.380  Finally, it is necessary to pre-
serve the professional integrity of the medical profession.  A rule that
permits a patient or surrogate to force a physician to provide treat-
ment over his objections has rather broad consequences.381  If the pa-
tient or surrogate is successful, she compels a physician to
affirmatively act against his medical judgment and what he believes
are the best interests of the patient.382  Accordingly, a denial of treat-
ment over the objections of the patient is viewed as upholding “the
obligation of physicians, as articulated in the Hippocratic Oath, . . . to
376. E.g., Kolata, supra note 32, at A1.
377. Id. (quoting Massachusetts General Hospital officials, and stating that offering
care under these conditions can “become[ ] disabling for the health care team”).
378. See Daar, supra note 50, at 1245.
379. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 247, at 24.
380. See id. at 17; see also Daar, supra note 50, at 1245 (opining that the physician’s
only remaining role would be to physically dispense medical treatments).
381. “[W]e must recognize that more is at stake than a contest of values; the auton-
omy, integrity, and future of the medical profession are inevitably highlighted in
such clashes.” Daar, supra note 50, at 225.
382. See Daar, supra note 50, at 234 (“Hospitals addressing the tension between pa-
tients and physicians over the provision of medically ineffective treatment have
shown increasing empathy for the plight of physicians asked to compromise their
professional conscience by acting against their best medical judgment.”).  This
argument might seem a bit circular in the context of this Article.  I have argued
that physicians making a futility declaration are making a claim that is based on
the physician’s normative preferences rather than true medical judgment or any-
thing resembling the interests of the patient.  But note that I speak now from the
perspective of the physician and physicians generally articulate futility claims in
these terms.  If we take physicians on their word, forcing them to treat their pa-
tients would indeed violate their judgment (which they may erroneously believe
to be grounded on medical principles) and what they subjectively believe to be in
the best interests of their patient.
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act for the benefit of the patient according to their ability and
judgment.”383
To illustrate how forcing medical professionals to offer care (over
the objections outlined above) is disruptive to physician autonomy and
the integrity of the medical profession, I return to the case of Barbara
Howe.384  Barbara suffered from Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS),
also known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease.385  After persisting in the hospi-
tal for a year and a half, Barbara’s attending physician opined in 2001
that her condition would not improve, she was not able and would not
be able to communicate meaningfully with her family, and, based on
his prior conversations with Barbara, he believed that she did not
want to remain alive.386  Carol, Barbara’s daughter and health care
agent, disagreed.387  While she conceded that there might be a point
at which Barbara would wish to die, that point had not come.388  She
believed that Barbara wanted to remain alive until she was unable to
make simple physical responses to her family members, such as open-
ing an eye.389  So Barbara remained alive and continued to receive
aggressive medical care.390  While it was clear to Barbara’s medical
staff that Barbara still had some cognitive ability in 2001,391 by the
time of the trial in 2004, they believed that Barbara had no meaning-
ful ability to communicate her thoughts392 and no one knew for cer-
tain whether and to what extent Barbara was able to experience
pain.393  Further, it was questionable whether Barbara could commu-
nicate using facial signs to show that she was in pain.394  That uncer-
tainty tormented members of Barbara’s medical staff.395  Carol
continued to demand that Barbara receive aggressive treatment.396
When continued aggressive care necessitated the removal of Bar-
bara’s right eye,397 at least one of Barbara’s long-time nurses refused
383. John J. Paris et al., Beyond Autonomy—Physicians’ Refusal to Use Life-Prolong-
ing Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 354, 357
(1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
384. See In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar.
22, 2004); see also supra notes 338–69 and accompanying text.
385. Id. at *1, *3.
386. Id. at *5.
387. Id.
388. Id. at *5, *7.
389. Id.
390. Id. at *21.
391. Id. at *5.
392. Id. at *18.
393. Id. at *8, *19.
394. Id. at *19.
395. Id. at *8 (“[T]his issue of whether or not Mrs. Howe is suffering does torment
many of her care givers.”).
396. Id. at *8, *19.
397. Id. at *11.
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to participate, claiming that the process was “vile” and a “disgrace.”398
Another nurse described the treatment as “morally and ethically
wrong” while yet another expressed that she was “saddened” by the
thought that she increased Barbara’s suffering by caring for Barbara
in the manner requested.399  All of this came to a head on June 6,
2003 when the chairman of the hospital’s Optimal Care Committee
issued the following statement:
There is now 100% unanimous agreement that this inhumane travesty has
gone far enough.  This is the Massachusetts General Hospital, not Au-
schwitz. . . . They [the Hospital staff] have lived for two years with the appal-
ling realization that they are under orders to resuscitate [Barbara] and so
guarantee that her gallant life will be wiped out by a senseless act of brutal-
ity.400  The administrative mandate [to resuscitate] demands that the dimen-
sion of emotion in their care be shut out, repressed, stamped on, derogated, or
just plain pretended away.  It is therefore not only delusional but unfair. It
demands that the entire body of caregivers violate their professional oaths, the
standards of medical and nursing practice, the standards of the Massachusetts
General Hospital, and the standards of ethics, morality, human decency and
common sense. . . . The family has been allowed to dictate medical practice.
The resuscitation orders themselves were written by attorneys and make abso-
lutely no medical sense whatsoever. . . . Today Mrs. Howe is doomed to inevita-
ble endopthalmitis [sic] which brings with it excruciating pain. . . . This
tolerance of deliberately inflicted pain on Mrs. Howe must stop at once.401
It would be callous not to recognize both the anguish of medical
professionals asked to offer treatment under circumstances such as
these and the plight of a profession forced to surrender its professional
discretion.  But it would also be callous not to recognize the plight of a
patient or surrogate placed at the whim of her medical staff when that
staff decides not to work to preserve the patient’s life.
When patient and physician autonomy come into conflict, the ques-
tion of which ought to rule is an interesting one, but is ultimately de-
cided by law.  Physicians have a contractual and fiduciary402
relationship with their patients.  When the legal restrictions on the
physician are in force, his desire or lack thereof to treat his patient is
398. Id. at *14.
399. Id.
400. The process of resuscitation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in particular,
“is a brutal therapy which causes pain, may fracture ribs, and may lacerate inter-
nal organs.” Id. at *7.
401. Id. at *12 (insertion of “[the Hospital staff]” in original) (emphasis added) (foot-
note added).
402. “There can be little dispute that a doctor occupies a condition of trust and confi-
dence, a fiduciary relationship with [the] patient.”  Taber v. Riordan, 403 N.E.2d
1349, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); see also Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos,
Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk
to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1188 & n.110 (2009) (discussing the
fiduciary duties of a physician).
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irrelevant.403  It does not matter that he has good reasons for not
wanting to provide treatment that he is obligated to provide.  Underly-
ing normative arguments certainly inform the legal analysis, but to
the extent that the legal questions are resolved, those normative argu-
ments provide the physician no legal defense.  Nevertheless, the nor-
mative questions are best resolved in favor of the patient, as I explain
below.
In futility cases, the principal question is one of scope.  If the scope
of the physician’s relationship with his patient extends to “futile” care,
failure to provide care is a breach of fiduciary duty,404 the tort of pa-
tient abandonment,405 or breach of contract.406  If, however, the scope
403. At the end of this section, I entertain the possibility that conscientious objection
might provide a basis to permit the unilateral withdrawal of treatment. See infra
notes 416–21 and accompanying text.  In this context, that would mean that a
conscientious objector is entitled to an exemption from existing background law.
Even if conscientious objection ought to be grounds for such an exemption, gen-
eral claims about autonomy are not. See id.
404. Breach of fiduciary duty in the context of a doctor-patient relationship is gener-
ally understood as a tort action on a theory of malpractice. See 70 C.J.S. Physi-
cians, Surgeons, and other Health-Care Providers § 81 (2005).  Because the duty
of care is generally defined by custom, see id. § 87, and the custom of physicians
is not to provide “futile” care, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty would seem to
be a dead letter.  Indeed, courts have given little attention to breach of fiduciary
duty as a cause of action distinct from malpractice. See id. § 81 (“Malpractice . . .
may be defined as comprising all acts and omissions of a physician or surgeon as
. . . to a patient . . . which may make the physician or surgeon either civilly or
criminally liable.”).  But no court has explored the question in the context of med-
ical futility either and the facts presented by futility cases suggest that a differ-
ent approach to understanding fiduciary obligations is in order. See generally
Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 402, at 1200–10 (articulating the fiduciary
duty as theory distinct from malpractice).  Fiduciary responsibilities are nowhere
more acute than where trust has brought the beneficiary of the relationship into
a helpless and dependant position. See id. at 1186.  When a patient enters a
relationship in trust of her physician, she expects that the physician will provide
care according to her wishes. See id.  Where there was no prior discussion about
“futile” treatment and the patient had no reason to believe that the physician
would not provide “futile” care, the patient might reasonably expect that “futile”
care will be provided. See id. at 1192–93.  Fiduciary law seeks to honor those
reasonable expectations and not permit the dominant party to abuse the trust
granted to him. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health-Care Prov-
iders § 76.  If we accept that the doctor-patient relationship extends to “futile”
care, this fiduciary relationship requires the physician to act even against his
interests and wishes. See id.  The physician’s autonomy does not protect him.
405. Patient abandonment is a form of medical malpractice that grows out of the fidu-
ciary relationship between patient and physician.  See 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Sur-
geons, and Other Health-Care Providers § 98.  Patient abandonment generally
has three elements.  The physician must (1) unilaterally terminate care (2) with-
out providing sufficient (a rather ambiguous term) notice to the patient at a time
when (3) additional care is necessary (another ambiguous term). See, e.g.,
Granek v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 172 S.W.3d 761, 766 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005).  Similar to the analysis regarding fiduciary duty, see supra note 404, the
tort of patient abandonment protects patients from being abused by their physi-
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of that relationship is defined more narrowly, to exclude “futile” care,
failure to provide care is completely unactionable, regardless of the
merits of the aforementioned normative and moral arguments about
physician autonomy.  So stated, the relevant legal question is quite
simple: does the fiduciary407 and contractual408 relationship between
the patient and physician extend to demands of “futile” care?
The three causes of action of the prior paragraph have one impor-
tant point in common in the context of “futile” care:  The autonomy of
the physician plays no role in their analysis because that autonomy
cians while completely helpless. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other
Health-Care Providers § 98.  Traditionally, patient abandonment applies where a
physician accepts care of a patient and then walks away from the patient during
the course of treatment in a context clearly within the scope of their relationship.
See id.  Assuming that “futile” care is within the scope of the relationship, see
infra note 406, the physician that denies “futile” care and permits his patient’s
condition to progress has abandoned the patient even if he continues to provide
palliative care or some other limited form of care.  The three elements are all met:
The physician who terminates life saving care is terminating all meaningful care
(defined from the prospective of the patient), he does so without providing suffi-
cient notice given that at the time these cases arise the patient is helpless, thus
rendering the provision of sufficient notice impossible (transfer to a willing com-
petent physician would provide the only adequate alternative), and the additional
requested care is necessary to the patient (again defined from the prospective of
the patient).
406. When a contract, whether written or oral, is silent to particular terms, and there
was no prior mutual understanding or mistake as to the meaning of the missing
term, the law generally imposes a default rule. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound
of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822–26
(1992); see also, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2005) (setting forth default rules defining
the price of a sale when the contract fails to specify a price); Rickersten v. Car-
skadon, 172 Neb. 46, 48, 108 N.W.2d 392, 395 (1961).  To date, American courts
addressing futility cases with living patients have generally compelled continued
treatment. See supra Part III.  While no court has expressly addressed the ques-
tion, they virtually unanimously demand that the court err on the side of life
when there is not time or sufficient information to fully address the underlying
questions. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280–81 (1990)
(holding that preserving life and ensuring accuracy in end-of-life decision-making
are both compelling governmental interests); In re President & Dirs. of Ge-
orgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009–10 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (“Death could have
mooted the cause in a matter of minutes, if action were not taken to preserve the
status quo.  To refuse to act, only to find later that the law required action, was a
risk I was unwilling to accept.  I determined to act on the side of life.”) (order by J.
Skelly Wright, J.).  Arguably, these cases illustrate that a default rule has devel-
oped requiring the provision of care, at least until a court ordered cessation.  Ac-
cordingly, parties contracting for medical care would have to contract around that
default rule if they desired a different result.
407. The fiduciary relationship is also the basis for the tort of abandonment. See 70
C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health-Care Providers § 98.
408. Even where there is no written contract, there is at least an oral or implied con-
tract between any physician and patient. See generally 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Sur-
geons, and Other Health-Care Providers § 79 (“The relationship of physician or
surgeon and patient is one arising out of a contract, express or implied.”).
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does not define the scope of the doctor-patient relationship.  Indeed,
the nature of a fiduciary relationship–a requirement under tort law to
affirmatively act (as in the case of patient abandonment)–or a contract
is to diminish, not expand, the autonomy of the parties.  Aside for
some brief comments in the footnotes,409 I will not discuss here the
merits of the aforementioned causes of action as that would occupy too
much space and would be beyond the scope of this Article.  I mention
them only to show that while “physician autonomy” presents some in-
teresting normative arguments, it does not compel any particular con-
clusion.  It is rather an afterthought if one comes to the conclusion
that the scope of the doctor-patient relationship does not extend to
“futile” care.  If there is no relationship that compels the physician to
act, his autonomy protects him from acting.  But if there is a relation-
ship that compels action, it compels action in spite of his autonomy.
The arguments presented throughout Part IV of this Article, in con-
trast, help to define the scope of the doctor-patient relationship by
identifying the valid arguments and theoretical bases from which to
approach that question.
Further, there are strong normative and moral arguments against
upholding physician autonomy in the context of “futility.”  Patients in
futility cases that lack a sudden trauma and debilitation410 enter into
a submissive trust relationship.  Once the patient’s condition deterio-
rates to the point that she is no longer able to protect her interests,
the physician’s responsibilities as an agent are heightened.  The phy-
sician is not just performing a job, he is acting on behalf of the patient
in an effort to actualize her interests.  By withdrawing treatment that
the patient reasonably411 expected to receive, the physician is doing
more than exercising his autonomy.  He is also violating the trust of
his helpless patient.  If the physician had strong feelings about “futile”
care, he should have made those known ex ante so that the patient
could have found another physician while she was able to do so.  She is
now stuck–and so is her physician.
And in the context of emergency care, when there is no pre-existing
trust relationship, Congress stepped in and imposed affirmative obli-
gations on physicians and hospitals.  Congress enacted EMTALA to
force hospitals to “stabilize”412 emergency care patients when the pa-
tient has no ability to care for herself.413  No exception is made for
futility patients and the statute, properly read, is fully applicable in
409. See supra notes 404–06.  Much more can and must be said about all three causes
of action.  I will have to save those comments for another day.
410. I discuss emergent cases below.
411. While the expectations might not be reasonable from the physician’s perspective,
they are reasonable from the patient’s perspective.  And it is her perspective that
is relevant to the present analysis.
412. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(b)(1)(A) (2006).
413. See supra sections III.C–D.
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futility cases.414  EMTALA is not pragmatic, it is a moral legislation
expressing the sense of society that people in these extremely vulnera-
ble situations demand special protection as a function of their dignity.
The specific requirements imposed by this dignity in futility situations
are debatable and personal.  By demanding stabilization, Congress set
the bar very high to account for difference of opinion and to respect the
dignity of all emergency care patients, even those who believe that the
respect for human life requires heroic and perhaps rather painful ef-
forts in the face of “futility.”
Note that where the physician claims that he is compelled by his
conscience not to provide treatment, the analysis might be different.
While much of the rhetoric at the beginning of this section referred to
violations of conscience, the actual cases never discuss true conscience
violations.  Accordingly, my analysis thus far pertains to violations of
autonomy, rather than conscience.  When “sincere and meaningful”
claims that “occup[y] a place in the life of [the physician] parallel to
that filled [in the minds of the religious] by the orthodox belief in G[-
]d”415 categorically forbid the provision of “futile” care, the physician’s
autonomy claims become conscience claims.  He is a conscientious ob-
jector; the proper analysis of his objection changes significantly be-
cause the normative force and scope of his argument is different for
reasons beyond the scope of this Article.416  Conscience claims by phy-
sicians are very uncommon in futility cases.  In every futility case of
which I am aware, including that of Barbara Howe,417 those asserting
the right to terminate care have not argued that they would rather go
to prison than to provide the requested care.  They have not argued
that they are compelled by something, whether G-d, religious belief, or
a deeply held worldview that forbids treatment.418  Rather, they
might argue that they are asked to do something that is “unfair” and
414. See Moses v. Providence Hosp., 561 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S.Ct. 3499 (2010).
415. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (discussing the conscientious objector standard
of a sincere and meaningful religious belief).
416. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 326–37 (“The nontheist’s belief in transcendent moral obligations–in obliga-
tions that transcend his self-interest and his personal preferences and which he
experiences as so strong that he has no choice but to comply–is analogous to the
transcendent moral obligations that are part of the cluster of theistic beliefs that
we recognize as religious.”). See generally, e.g., Kevin J. Hasson, Religious Lib-
erty and Human Dignity: A Tale of Two Declarations, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
81 (2003) (noting the societal and personal value of sincerely held religious beliefs
and the interests of government in protecting them).
417. See In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar.
22, 2004).
418. The fact that someone uses the word “conscience” or uses other rhetoric of consci-
entious objection does not automatically make the objection a conscience claim
rather than a general autonomy claim. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971,
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“makes absolutely no medical . . . sense whatsoever” in part because it
is “inhumane” and “brutal[ ].”419  They might believe that continued
treatment is wasteful, inefficient, harmful to the patient, foolish, or
something along those lines.  While these arguments are significant
and perhaps valid in many cases, they do not rise to conscience claims.
Because conscience claims by physicians are so uncommon, conscience
claims that directly implicate severe injury against third parties are
particularly complicated,420 and balancing the conscience of the physi-
cians against the arguments in favor of continued treatment is exceed-
ingly difficult, I will not attempt to so balance.
C. The Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources
My arguments against medical futility would not be complete ab-
sent a discussion on rationing.  Medical resources are scarce, as are
the dollars that finance them.421  If patients have unfettered author-
ity to demand that physicians provide care, and policy makers are
helpless to deny treatment in the face of those demands, it may prove
difficult to allocate medical resources efficiently.422  Similarly “if the
benefits of a treatment are so debatable that [many people] consider
them not to exist, that is an obvious place to conserve [scarce medical]
resources,” thus mitigating the problems of allocation.423
There is a strong argument, which many have accepted, that the
arena of medical futility is a great place to conserve scarce medical
resources.424  That is, even if medical futility has no ideological or in-
ternal justification (indeed, even if it is entirely incoherent), it is exter-
980–81 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding a finding that an applicant’s objections were
not true “conscience” claims).
419. See In re Howe, 2004 WL 1446057 at *12.
420. Conscience claims typically arise in the context of military service and abortion.
Generally, when an enlisted member of the military says that he cannot serve or
a physician says that she is not able to perform an abortion, the impact on third
parties is minimal (highly unusual cases excepted).  The military’s loss of one
solider generally does not impair the military; this physician’s refusal does not
prevent the patient from obtaining an abortion.  But regarding futility cases in
which transfer is not an option, the physician’s conscience claim implicates se-
vere and permanent physical harm to another person.
421. See Monica Schoch-Spana et al., Influenza Vaccine Scarcity 2004–05: Implica-
tions for Biosecurity and Public Health Preparedness, 3 BIOSECURITY & BIOTER-
RORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 224, 224 (2005) (“Scarcity of life-
saving resources is one of the most complex challenges that decision makers may
face when managing the impact of a biological attack . . . .”).
422. Id.
423. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 247, at 28.
424. E.g., id. at 17, 28–29; Paris et al., supra note 384, at 357 (referring to the provi-
sion of “futile” medical treatment as a “misallocation of resources and personnel”
and declaring that providing resources to a “futile” patient “would impose exces-
sive and unnecessary expense on the community”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL
PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 68–69 (Addison-Wesley Publ’g
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nally justified through efficiency arguments.  Thus, economic
efficiency provides, in the eyes of some commentators, a robust justifi-
cation for withdrawing care in “futility” cases.425  This section will ex-
plore whether scarcity provides a sufficient external justification for
the futility movement.
Notwithstanding the genuine problems relating to the scarcity of
medical resources, the AMA has stated that the scarcity of resources is
not a defense for the futility movement and that futility must be de-
bated on its own terms out in the public square.426  First, the AMA
fears that if scarcity is used to justify futility, the two issues may be
confused as part of the same problem.427  Decisions relating to both
scarcity and futility are often necessary, says the AMA, but they are
different and need to be kept analytically separate.428  Second, the
AMA states that even if it would be logically appropriate to conflate
scarcity and futility, it is unclear that denying treatment to futility
patients would conserve resources at a volume sufficient to justify the
futility movement because some estimates suggest that doing so
would effect only a “minor” health care savings.429
The propriety of the AMA’s recommendations are debatable.  Ac-
cording to some commentators, scarcity is not a problem that can be
expressly addressed in the public forum because any discussion relat-
ing to the conservation of medical resources will necessarily involve
weighing and violating important social norms.430  It is harmful for
society when decision-makers explicitly state that they will allow one
person or class of people to die in favor of saving another person or
class.  Accordingly, many political actors, including the British gov-
ernment in 1992, have argued that, as a matter of social policy, it is
better to tell patients who will be denied medical care in order to re-
serve a scarce resource for another patient, that modern medicine is
Co.1999) (arguing that under the “veil of ignorance” most of us would choose bet-
ter preventative care over end-of-life and emergent care).
425. At least one commentator wrote about the case of Baby Ryan (in which Ryan
Nguyen’s parents insisted on aggressive medical treatment over the objections of
Ryan’s doctors, see Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Med. Center, 987 P.2d 634 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999)), arguing that the effort to keep Ryan alive imposed an economic
drain on society that ought not to be readily tolerated.  Ostrom, supra note 194.
It is interesting that she chose this case, considering that Baby Ryan partially
recovered and lived four years following his treatment. See id.  In light of its
conclusion, this case provides a remarkably weak efficiency justification.
426. AMA Report, supra note 261, at 938.
427. See id.
428. See id.
429. See id. I am accepting the AMA’s position as a basis for argument without adopt-
ing it as my own.  I suspect that the AMA might be overstating its case here, see,
e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 424, at 63–65, but I do not adopt an opinion for the
purpose of this Article.
430. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18–21 (W.W. Norton &
Co. 1978).
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unable to help them; that “nothing more can be done medically.”431
Medical futility may thus be an appropriate subterfuge for decision-
makers to utilize for the purpose of conserving medical resources with-
out admitting to the public that this is what they are doing.  In other
words, even if the medical futility movement is not coherent and is not
independently justified, it may nonetheless be desirable as a means to
a larger end.  According to Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, the use
of such a subterfuge is important to insure that the “tragic choices”
made by official decision-makers seem “necessary [and] unavoidable,
rather than chosen.”432
Many commentators have criticized Calabresi and Bobbitt’s ap-
proach for its lack of candor.433  I have commented elsewhere about
the use of the Calabresi and Bobbitt’s approach in the specific context
of bioterror preparedness, arguing that the use of subterfuge is not
appropriate wherever the subterfuge itself will be conspicuous to the
public, even if the public will not be able to discern what the subter-
fuge is intended to conceal.434  I think that both of those critiques are
applicable here, in the context of medical futility, but wish to add a
third critique that renders the use of medical futility wholly inappro-
priate for use as a subterfuge in any case.
The purpose of subterfuge is to disguise the allocation of medical
resources in favor of one human being at the expense of another be-
cause doing so would violate the esteem in which we hold human
life.435  If society’s chosen subterfuge is not the supposed inability of
medical science to provide treatment, such as Great Britain claimed
when it denied dialysis to sixty-five percent of medically indicated pa-
tients,436 but rather the declaration that the patient who will be de-
nied treatment is less-worthy of that treatment (by virtue of its being
“futile”), there is no need for a subterfuge.  Indeed, using a subterfuge
431. Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Ap-
proach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1612 (1992) (stating that Great Britain denied
dialysis to those aged over sixty-five—or to those over fifty-five who also had a
complicating medical condition—to ensure that dialysis machines would be avail-
able for younger patients).
432. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 430, at 21.
433. See, e.g., Fleck, supra note 431, at 1612–18; David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judi-
cial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 749 (1987) (suggesting that the value of
human life may better be served by a candid discussion about the tension be-
tween that value and, for example, the desire not to prolong human suffering).
434. Meir Katz, Note, Bioterrorism and Public Law: The Ethics of Scarce Medical Re-
source Allocation in Mass Casualty Situations, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795,
818–19 (2008).
435. See Fleck, supra note 431, at 1608–09 (stating that when we devote untold re-
sources into the search and rescue effort following a coal mine collapse, “we will
have affirmed that human life is priceless . . . though we effectively [priced
human life] at the safety allocation level”).
436. Id. at 1612.
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in that scenario may be more destructive than simply declaring that
rules of allocation dictate that one patient will be saved and not the
other.  To use an extreme example, John, an eighty-five-year-old AIDS
patient with diabetes and cardiovascular deficiency and Mike, a
healthy twenty-three year-old are brought to the emergency room of a
small rural hospital following a car crash.  Both need immediate ac-
cess to the hospital’s only respirator.  Under traditional principles of
medical allocation, the hospital can justify giving the respirator to
Mike.437  Those principles are outlined in the footnotes.  If the hospi-
tal opted instead to conceal its use of explicit allocation by adopting a
subterfuge, it would be serving no one by declaring that further care of
John, an elderly AIDS patient, is “futile.”  Although John’s medical
condition, viewed holistically, may be relevant to the hospital triage
437. See Kenneth V. Iserson & John C. Moskop, Triage in Medicine, Part I: Concept,
History, and Types, 49 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE 275, 279 (2007).  Hospi-
tals use “triage” systems to help them queue patients for treatment.  These are
generally not rules of exclusion, but rather are rules of priority.  They operate
generally by placing each patient in one of five groups. Id. at 279.  Patients
placed in the highest priority group are those who need immediate medical treat-
ment and who can be saved by treatment that the hospital has the capacity (both
in terms of technology and in terms of supply) to administer. See id.  Patients
who have suffered only psychological trauma are given the lowest priority and in
some cases may be asked to seek treatment elsewhere. Id.  Patients “whose con-
dition exceeds the available therapeutic resources” or whose medical needs are
greater than the hospital is able to provide under the circumstances receive no
priority; they are “black tagged” and are not treated unless the hospital discovers
that the patient was assessed incorrectly, resources unexpectedly become availa-
ble, or the patient’s medical condition improves and shifts into another priority
category. See id.; WORLD MED. ASS’N, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION STATEMENT
ON MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS (2006), http://www.wma.net/e/
policy/d7.htm.  These triage programs do not generally permit a hospital to deny
treatment to a patient whose needs are great and prognosis poor where there is
not an immediate or anticipated need for the necessary resources. See id.  They
generally assume two patients, presented before the hospital in close temporal
proximity (or where the latter patient is reasonably expected, given statistical
data, to soon present himself before the hospital), both of whom are seen to have
equal rights to health care and would both be treated under normal circum-
stances, but have come to the hospital under extraordinary circumstances.  If a
hospital must choose between devoting its resources to a patient who has a rea-
sonable chance of recovery and one who does not, it is fully justified under tradi-
tional systems of triage to devote its resources to that patient who can recover.
But where the hospital has the technological capacity and sufficient medical re-
sources to treat both patients, or where it is statistically unlikely (based on prior
experience) that a second patient who will need the specific resources exhausted
by the treatment of the first patient will present himself to the hospital (prior to
the time that the hospital can reasonably expect to obtain more such resources),
rules relating to allocation and triage say nothing. See id.  It is uncontroversial
that where a hospital is presented with one patient in need of medical services,
and has sufficient resources on hand to treat that patient, the hospital would not
be justified, under traditional triage doctrine, to deny treatment out of specula-
tive fear that more “worthy” patients may come later. See id.
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officer designated the responsibility of deciding who will receive treat-
ment first, neither John’s age nor his status as an AIDS patient pro-
vides a legitimate basis to deny access to medical care in the absence
of significant mitigating factors.  Identifying those specific aspects of
John’s medical history as a basis for denying care by way of subterfuge
violates important social values to a much greater extent than would
conspicuous and explicit allocation due to the absence of sufficient
resources.
Withdrawing aggressive medical care from the “futile” patient can
be independently appropriate as a vehicle to achieve efficient alloca-
tion only where preliminary decisions regarding the relative value of
the “futile” patient’s life are established and publicly accepted. We
need some other basis to choose between these two patients.  And as I
have argued in this Article,438 the medical profession does not have
the expertise and is not sufficiently free from bias to make those pre-
liminary decisions competently.  Accordingly, the argument that the
futility movement is justified because it satisfies society’s need to allo-
cate medical resources needs significant development and normative
authority.
The obvious response is that if we must choose, and we must, the
logical choice is to choose the patient who will live.  While that knee
jerk may be initially intuitive, it needs logical support.  The necessity
of rationing is documented and commentators and decision-makers
approach that necessity in a wide variety of ways.  Some have argued
that the resources are better allocated to he who arrived first, rather
than giving them to the patient who will most benefit from them.439  A
similar approach, using the facts in my hypothetical above, would be
to give the respirator to the patient closest to it at the time that the
respirator must be allocated.440  Others have suggested that adopting
a lottery provides a better approach.441  I have dealt with these and
other approaches to rationing at length elsewhere442 and they are be-
yond the scope of this Article. My point here is simple and, I think,
uncontroversial.  Rationing and futility are indeed separate ideas, just
as the AMA argued.443  The necessity of rationing exists regardless of
the doctrine of medical futility and medical futility is not obviously the
best or only vehicle to solve the problem of rationing.444  The necessity
438. Supra Part IV.
439. See Katz, supra note 434, at 799–805.
440. See id.
441. See id.
442. See id.
443. See supra note 426 and accompanying text.  AMA’s second argument–that the
cost savings from adopting a futility standard is unlikely to result in significant
savings–might also be correct but is unnecessary for the development of this
argument.
444. Katz, supra note 434, at 104.
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of rationing thus provides no external logical or normative justifica-
tion to medical futility.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law that has developed in the United States pertaining to
medical futility is confusing.  There may be no concise analytical way
to describe the state of the law or how courts decide futility cases be-
cause the underlying inquiries are often highly fact-intensive.  Some
have postulated that the “law” provides only that when a patient or
surrogate comes to court, the court is very likely to grant an injunction
to keep the patient alive but if the family comes after the death of the
patient to collect damages, the court is very likely to award none, as-
suming that the hospital or physician acted in accord with the prevail-
ing standards of care.445  The question then becomes how to define
those standards of care and if the law ought to place limitations on the
medical community’s ability to define them.
The doctrine of medical futility makes certain significant underly-
ing and questionable assumptions about human life, the lives of ill
patients, and about the medical community’s ability to decide impor-
tant ethical questions, including regarding the value of the lives of
individual patients.  The value of the continuation of a human life is
defined not exclusively physiologically but also according to various
personal inquires that are beyond the expertise of the medical commu-
nity.  The life of someone in a persistent vegetative state may be su-
premely valuable to the patient and her family.  And the goals of that
patient may be distinctly non-physiological.  Modern medicine is thus
an inappropriate tool for accessing the patient’s needs.  The decision,
then, to cease the provision of medical care for a given patient solely
on the grounds that her life is of low quality and because she has a
diminished probability of recovery is incoherent; the “futility” of treat-
ment can play no independent role in medical decision-making.
The medical community asserts its ability to make controversial
decisions in moral philosophy by appealing to its neutral position as
arbiters of all questions relating to medicine.  Society, of course, has
not given its imprimatur to the medical community to engage in ama-
teur moral philosophy.  That community has no expertise to engage in
ethics or philosophy and lacks the normative authority necessary to
render decisions in futility cases.  Further, we must be concerned that
institutional bias within the medical community affects its ability to
make important ethical decisions for society.  This problem is exacer-
bated when the society that the medical community seeks to represent
and the medical community itself seem to adopt different views re-
445. See supra Part III.
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garding the moral, religious, ethical, emotional, and personal ques-
tions that underlie medical futility cases.
Accordingly, we ought to design our end-of-life treatment policies
in a manner that respects the interests of the patient and “tolerate[s]
the choices of others, even when we believe they are wrong.”446
446. Truog, supra note 225, at 3; see Katz, supra note 323, at 107–14.
